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1 • 
INTRODUCTION 
(i) 
Historians have not yet provided a detailed 
authenticated account of Anthony Eden's term as Foreign 
Secretary in the Chamberlain Cabinet and of his resignation. 
Written in the immediate aftermath of Eden's 
resignation , the Chatham House account reflects the mixture 
of confusion and speculation manifested by contemporary 
spectators caught largely unaware , despite rumours, by an 
event supposedly significant but the precise nature of that 
· · f . 1 · 1 signi icance e usive. By the time Churchill's version 
appears , with the aid of hindsight after the holocaust, a 
rift based on clear-cut policy alternatives is discerned. 
On one side there is Chamberlain and his ageing sycophants 
bedazzled by a quest for 'peace in their time', conceived 
as a mission , therefore unthwartable and increasingly repres-
enting a position of weakness; on the other Eden, with 
harsher principles for dealing with truculent dictators , a 
martyr to a more resolute cause. The rift is therefore 
inevitable , and significant in the chronicling of the 
'disastrous ' policy of appeasement, because it centres on 
1. A. Toynbee (ed . ) [with V.M. Boulter] for The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs , Survey of 
International Affairs 1937 Vol. 1 , London 1938, p.337 
(hereafter I . R.R.A . Survey) . 
I . R. R. A. Survey 1938, PP• 128-137. 
2. 
different principles for the execution of foreign policy. 2 
Variations on what might be called the 'principles• line' 
appear in the later work of Rowse, Kenney, Mowat, George and 
Rock~ who also concur, with varying degrees of moral con-
demnation, in recognising a conspiracy element in the 
'removal' of Eden. They make much of Chamberlain's use of 
informal 'backdoor' diplomacy. 
At the extreme side of this group is the Kenney article, 
in which Chamberlain, the child of stupidity, is metamorphosed 
into the prince of darkness who 'as early as the Spring of 
1936 [seems] to have reached a decision to secure for himself 
a dominant position in the formulation of British policr. 
Through a combination of chance and fanatical determination, 
his goal was achieved and was dramatically signalized two years 
4 later by the resignation of the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden.• 
2. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, London 1948, pp.187-
201. Churchill wrote: •[when I got the news of Eden's 
resignation] I lay on my bed consumed by emotions of sorrow 
and fear. There seemed one strong, young figure standing 
up against long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender, 
of wrong measurements and feeble impulses •• • now he was 
gone • •• I watched the daylight slowly creep in through the 
windows and saw before me in mental gaze the vision of 
Death.' p.201 . 
3. A.L. Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement, London 1961, 
PP• 37-75. Introduction to M. George, The Hollow Me.n, 
London 1967, pp.7-12. 
M.L. Kenney, 'The Role of the House of Commons in British 
Foreign Policy During the 1937-38 Session• in Norton Downs 
(ed.) Essafs in Honour of Conyers Read Chicago 1955. 
p.138 ff. Hereafter Kenney). 
C.L. Mowat, Britain Between the \ars, London 1955, pp . 589-598. 
William Rock, Appeasement on Trial, Hamden, Conn. 1966, 
p.20-31. (Hereafter~). 
4. Kenney, p.138. 
Contrasting with this damning account is the view of the 
Chamberlain apologist, Mcleod. Reworking the Chamberlain 
diaries already fielded by Feiling, he shifts the perspective 
to highlight personality factors and to minimise policy 
differences. He presents an Eden reluctant to make his 
resentments known, a Chamberlain with an understandable 
tendency to take advantage of such a failing, a consequent 
build-up of pressure and belated assertion from the Foreign 
Secretary. He sees basic agreement over foreign policy in 
general and a softer stand on de jure recognition of Abyssinia 
on Eden's part than he is usually attributed.5 
The revisions of Medlicott and Northedge6 , while only 
skirting over the rift, follow a similar line, Medlicott main-
taining that 'it is difficult to see in the breach ••• anything 
more than a difference of timing on the part of two very self-
willed men who liked to play the game of politics by ear.• 7 
A.J.P. Taylor belongs to the 'principles' line' but is 
not sympathetic to Eden, seeing him as a man of big words and 
little action - in dealing with his cabinet colleagues as much 
5. Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain , London 
1946, PP• 320-342. 
W. Mcleod, Neville Chamberlain, London p. 217. 
6. W. Medlicott, Contemporary England, London 1967, p.372. 
(hereafter Medlicott, Contemporary). 
British Forei n Polic since Versailles, 
London 196, p.173. Hereafter Medlicott, British). 
7. Medlicott, British p.173. 
~--J 
4. 
as in'making faces' at the dictators. 8 D.C. Watt follows a 
'principles' line' as well but changes the emphases - what 
Medlicott would describe as problems of method and timing, 
in terms of consequence, can only be regarded as a direct 
conflict of policy - whether 'the price to be paid [for 
securing a cessation of Italy's anti-British policy] would 
be a once and for all payment or merely a first instalment of 
a purchase on the 'never never' system.' 9 
Factors of personality are also an ingredient in Watt's 
picture , particularly in a later account written after the 
publication of the Avon Memoirs: 0 A fair measure of stupidity 
is thrown in as wel1. 11 
Neville Thompson ' s recent account might be described as a 
synthesis of both the 'principles'' and 'method and timing' 
lines, exacerbated by personality differences. This sensible 
mixture in, however , a much simplified account, makes the 
resignation neither inevitable nor manipulated, but 'pushed on 
both sides•. 12 
8. 
9. 
10 . 
11. 
12. 
A. J . P . Taylor , English History 1914-1945 , Oxford 1965, p.420 . 
D. C. Watt , Personalities and Policies , London 1964, p . 180. 
Anthony Eden (Earl of Avon ) , Memoirs , II , Facing the Dic-
tators , London 1962 (Hereafter!!£!:. . 
D.C. Watt, 'The Rise of a Revisionist School' in Wm. Laird 
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, A~peasement of the Dictators; Crisis 
Diplomacy , New Yor 1970, p.133. 
Neville Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers. Conservative 
Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930 ' s, Oxford 1971 
PP• 138-145 . 
5. 
The historiography of the Eden and Chamberlain rift is 
not vast. In many accounts it figures only as a second or 
third line contributing factor, or prologue, to a larger 
canvas overshadowed by Munich, and therefore is plotted in 
little detail. Problems of principles, timing, method and 
personality in different context and combination can lead to 
substantially the same conclusions which, however, are ex-
pressed in ways which make them appear significantly different. 
The release of the Cabinet Papers and Conclusions may help 
to solve such problems if attention is focussed primarily on 
the statements of the principals and their perceptions of 
issues at stake. The confusion of contemporary and retro-
spective accounts can be expected to be reflected in confusion 
within the Cabinet itself. But no doubt the reliance on largely 
circumstantial evidence has been a contributing factor to the 
confusion of the Eden and Chamberlain historiography. 
Accounts before Mowat rely entirely on circumstantial 
evidence. Mowat could only rely on the insubstantial contrib-
utions of Sir John Simon13 and Sir Samuel Hoare, 14 the former 
having restricted himself to material already made public, the 
latter stating perversely that Eden's belated critical posture 
was based on an ideological preference in the Spanish ar -
13. Viscount Simon, Retrospect, London 1952. 
14. Lord Templewood , Nine Troubled Years, London 1954 
(Hereafter Hoare). 
6. 
which perhaps reveals more about Hoare's ideological prefer-
ences. Some later contributions had the advantage of using 
the Avon Memoirs but only Gilbert's appeared after the 
release of official documentation. Gilbert , however, makes 
only one reference to the cabinet conclusions. It can be 
assumed that they did not form a major source for his chapter 
of synthesis. A new source available since 1970 , the diaries 
of Oliver Harvey, Private Secretary to Anthony Eden , has not 
yet been fielded. 15 
Scholarly work based on the Cabinet Papers and Conclusions 
to date has centred on the lines of enquiry already in train 
with the conservative revisionist general accounts of British 
inter-war foreign policy - the relationship between rearmament, 
economic policy and the appeasement of Germany. The occasion 
for Eden's resignation , consideration of attitudes towards Italy, 
has always been , appropriately , a second stream event in the 
inter-war histories. This relative slighting of Italy 'in view 
of the ultimately more important and consequential appeasement 
of Germany• 16 seems likely to continue. 
This dissertation , which uses official documentation and 
the Harvey diaries in addition to earlier sources , traces the 
attitudes of Anthony Eden to Italy throughout 1937 , until his 
16 . 
John Harvey 
1937-1940, 
~ ' p . 37 . 
(ed.) , The Di lomatic Diaries of Oliver Harve 
London 1970. Hereafter Harvey . 
7. 
resignation in February 1938, and his position in this area 
relative to Chamberlain and, more generally, the Cabinet. 
It examines the Eden and Chamberlain rift within this context. 
(ii) 
In 1935, lack of leadership in foreign policy under 
Sir John Simon17 and a split in Cabinet opinion in the months 
prior to the Ethiopian War resulted in the Ethiopian problem 
being turned over to Anthony Eden, created Junior Minister with-
out Portfolio in the mid-year Baldwin reshuffle. The resultant 
unwitting change of emphasis in policy was immediately recognised 
by Italy in her resort to bellicose •open diplomacy• 18 aimed 
principally at Eden. The nick-named 'Minister for League of 
Nations Affairs' reputation rose proportionately to the 
prominence given to Ethiopia in response to the miscalculated 
Italian press attacks. Eden's popular identification with all 
the brightest hopes for a new international order bound the 
Baldwin Cabinet to his conception of the role of the League in 
foreign policy. The link between his growing political capital 
and Ethiopia led Eden, with the new Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Samuel Hoare19 to extra-diplomatic exertions to forestall the 
17. Till mid-1935 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
From May 1937 Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
18. This refers to speeches and articles with wide circulation 
intended for not only public consumption but also states-
men of th~ nations who are the subject.of 'secret diplomacy' 
and 'closed diplomacy' - the normal diplomatic correspondence 
carried out by career-diplomats and principals. Diplomatic 
bargaining by open harassment or conviviality is a feature 
of diplomatic history in the 1930's, particularly favoured 
by fascist states. 
19. Sir Samuel Hoare M.P. (later Lord Templewood) Foreign 
8. 
impending Italian attack on Ethiopia. The dismissal of Hoare 
because of the unmasking of just such an exercise narrowed the 
possibilities for an efficacious middle way between a whole-
hearted opposition to Mussolini and abandonment of Ethiopia. 
As Foreign Secretary in 1936 Eden's knight-erranty was dis-
credited by the limited resistance of sanctions to Italy, the 
easy Italian victory, the unchallenged German occupation of 
the Rhineland, 20 the strategic withdrawal from sanctions 
Secretary for the second half of 1935. First Lord of 
the Admiralty in Baldwin's Cabinet 1936. 
20. In the Rhineland Crisis Hitler repeated the tactic he had 
used in the reintroduction of conscription in March 1935, 
that of stealing a march on a British offer of a package 
deal. On February 14, 1936 Eden had recommended acceptance 
of reoccupation as part of a comprehensive settlement. 
To the Cabinet on March 9, 1936, he said that 'by re-
occupying the Rhineland Hitler has deprived us of the 
possibility of making to him a concession which might 
otherwise have been a useful bargaining counter in our 
hands in the general negotiations with Germany which we 
had in contemplation to imitate.• Eden told the 
Cabinet that this was •a heavy blow to the sanctity of 
treaties• but added that 'fortunately there are grounds 
for hope that they will not lead to war.• Cabinet 
objections, therefore, were only to the means of 
revision - change must be by peaceful means. 
See W. Medlicott, Britain and Germany: The 
Search for a Settlement 1930-37. Creighton 
Lecture 1969. (Hereafter Medlicott Settlement). 
J.B. Duroselle, 'The Spirit of Locarno: 
Illusions of Pactomania', Foreign Affairs 
July 1972, p.757. 
following the 'midsummer madness' speech of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, 21 the onset of the Spanish War 
and the appearance of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Late 1936 saw 
Eden trying to clarify foreign policy to restore British and 
Conservative prestige, championing League reform and offering 
strong words to the dictators. 22 
21. Chamberlain told the 1900 Club: 'It is the very midsummer 
of madness ••• is it not apparent that the policy of sanctions 
involves, I do not say war, but the risk of war?' Baldwin 
disassociated the Government from Chamberlain's speech. 
Chamberlain apologised to Eden. In his diary Chamberlain 
recorded: 'I did it deliberately because I felt the party 
and the country needed a lead ••• I did not consult Anthony 
Eden because he would have been bound to beg me not to say 
what I proposed.' 
Keith Middlemass and John Barnes, Baldwin: a biography 
London 1969, p.939. (Hereafter Baldwin). 
22. Eden's major policy speech of late 1936 is worth examining 
because it was to quote it often in the Commons throughout 
1937 as the basis of British foreign policy. He said 
'the country must have strength if its ideals were to 
prevail in a rearming world; after rearmament its strength 
would never be used in a war of aggression or for any 
purpose inconsistent with the Covenant [of the League of 
Nations] or the Pact of Paris. They could, and if the 
occasion arose they would, be used in the defence of France 
and Belgium against unprovoked aggression, in accordance 
with our existing obligations and in the defence of Iraq 
and Egypt ••• there was no dispute about that, nor that 
Germany will be included in that guarantee if Germany were 
included in a treaty of that character. In addition, our 
armaments may be used in bringing help to a victim of 
aggression in any case where, in our judgement, it would 
be proper under the Provisions of the Covenant to do so. 
I use the word "may" deliberately since in such an instance 
there is no automatic obligation to take military action.' 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents 1937 
London 1938, p.34. (Hereafter Docs). 
Medlicott, Contemporary, pp. 350-51 comments 1) this is a 
reminder that Chamberlain alone was not voicing hopes for 
a bargain with Hitler. 2) British obligations were great. 
3) but 'the main significance lies ••• in Eden's insistence 
that the country had no automatic obligation under the 
Covenant to help a victim of aggression.' 
~, p.478 comments: 'this doctrine admittedly had its 
10. 
(iii) 
The attitudes of the British cabinet subsequent to being 
presented with the fait accompli of a conquered Abyssinia contain 
the same apparently contradictory impulses as in the response to 
the unfolding of that crisis. There was a tendency on the one 
hand not to regard Italy as a major power, with the corollary of 
not presenting a major threat to Britain, on the other a ten-
dency to respond sensitively and conciliatorily to any discern-
ible increase in the intensity of Italian anti-British 'open 
diplomacy•. The intermeshing of two likely irreconciliables is 
explained by cabinet perceptions of the circumstances under 
which an Italian assault was likely to take place and their 
understanding of the wider significance of such an attack for 
Britain's cautious defence planning. 
The very confidence with which the cabinet concurred in 
seeing a measure of Italian economic and political instability, 
which in their eyes kept her out of the realms of major power 
status, encouraged a hangover of the 1935 fear of a •mad dog' 
act. National self-immolation, in itself, contemplated in the 
context of single-handed war, could be confidentally dealt 
with but only at the expense of diverting defences from the 
perceived greater German menace. A •mad dog • act might also 
activate German expansionism, either directed into the Italian 
limitations. There was no universal commitment but the 
possibility of action was not excluded anywhere.' 
11. 
offensive or using an Italian distraction to make inroads into 
British interests elsewhere, either conceived narrowly or as 
altering the wider European power equation. 
Neither Anthony Eden nor Neville Chamberlain ~e free from 
these impulses. Both could, however, produce plans for dealing 
with the threat which tended to minimise its significance. 
Eden contemplated the unlikely possibility of independent 
action as an eventuality which could be guarded against by a 
show of strength and a dignified stand. Displays should be 
deterrant but not provocative, ostensibly leaving the way open 
for conciliation without humiliation, a stand coloured however 
by a certain distaste for Mussolini and scepticism of his 
assurances. That Eden could not contemplate effective counter 
offensive to clear Italian provocation severely compromised a 
personal stand which, though based on anti-Italian sentiment, 
could not translate such prejudice into policy. 
Chamberlain's plan was to chip away conciliatorarily at 
one end or the other of the Rome-Berlin Axis, imperative in 
view of cautious defence planning, with concentration on the 
greater menace, Germany, if and when possible. Collectively 
the cabinet majority zealously pursued Anglo-Italian reconcili-
ation. The need rose and feel in direct relation to perceptions 
of the imminence of an Italian onslaught, and therefore in 
response to the varying tone of the Italian public and diplomatic 
stand, and the likelihood or otherwise of improved relations 
with Germany. Cabinet perceptions of which was the more 
desirable mate varied. Italy was regarded as the less important 
12. 
but she was the more controversial because of the extremes of 
feeling towards her found in the cabinet. 
13. 
1. THE PROBLEM OF DE JURE RECOGNITION AND 'THE PROBABILITY 
OF WAR WITH ITALY' 
(i) 
Did Britain have to face the possibility of war with Italy? 
Or was genuine Anglo-Italian reconciliation possible? 
Following the Ethiopian affair Britain had to look to 
challenged assumptions of involiable Mediterranean naval and 
1 
aerial strength. Anglo-Italian estrangement continued and was 
complicated by Italian intervention in the Spanish 'ijar. 2 The 
Cabinet saw two alternatives: these were either 'Friendship 
with Italy or establishing ourselves in such military strength 
in the Mediterranean as would permanently deter Italy from em-
barking on war with us.• 3 
1. British interests in the Mediterranean were both strategic 
and commercial. British naval forces and bases were a 
means of exerting diplomatic pressure; their effectiveness 
depended on the weakness and neutrality of surrounding 
countries. 
See vm. Laird Kleine-Alhbrandt, The Policy of Simmering 
A Stud of British Forei n Polic durin the S anish Civil 
War, The Hague 19 2, PP• 37-50 passim. Hereafter Simmering). 
2. Mussolini's Spanish adventure gave Britain additional 
reason to be pessimistic about her Mediterranean capabilities. 
From the beginning of the Spanish ~ar Italy had virtually 
occupied ajorca and air bases were being constructed from 
Libya to the Dacedeconese, while Italian intervention for 
Franco amounted to active occupation of some Spanish areas. 
See I.R.R.A. Survey 1936, p.653, and below, Chapter Two. 
3. Public Record Office (hereafter P.R.O.), Cabinet Reference 
24/271 (hereafter Cab.) Committee of Imperial Defence Paper 
1305-B (hereafter C.I . D.), in Cabinet Paper 248(37) (here-
after C.P.). 
14. 
The Gentleman's Agreement of January 1937 was a still-
born preliminary to effecting the first alternative. It was 
no more than an exchange of Anglo-Italian goodwill in the 
Mediterranean. 4 Beyond this a de t en e seemed to depend on 
Mussolini's sine qua non of a British lead on de jure 
recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia . The Cabinet 
wished to grant de jure recognition, but moral strictures 
prevented them from acting at the League of Nations at least 
without French support. Eden was personally opposed to de jure 
recognition. 
The second alternative was inhibited by an informal assum-
ption that Britain could not afford to risk war with Italy. 
The Cabinet was confident that Anglo-Italian relations would be 
eventually restored to their pre-1935 footing. However, there 
was some attempt to define a middle way between the alternatives. 
The Cabinet wanted a middle way in the short term while they 
awaited a settlement. Eden wanted it until Britain was in a 
position to challenge Italy. The resulting periodic 'displays 
of progress in rearmament' were limited to 'doing nothing which 
could arouse Italian suspicions or be construed as provocative.•5 
4. The Gentleman's Agreement included vague mutual assurances 
to respect relative interests and an undefined status quo 
in the Mediterranean; consideration of Spain was limited 
to an appended Italian assurance of no territorial 
ambitions in the Mediterranean. 
See Simmering, as above 1. 
5. P.R.O. Cab. 24/271, C.I.D. 1305-B in C.P. 248(37). 
15. 
In these efforts to work out an effective Mediterranean 
diplomatic strategy, Eden initially welcomed Chamberlain's 
leadership. Eden did not define a position independent of 
the Prime Minister's general European strategy . Their similar , 
clearly hostile and sceptical , attitudes to Italy are evident 
beside a Cabinet exhibiting far less certitude . Chamberlain ' s 
attitude to Italy changed as new possibilities emerged for 
Anglo-Italian negotiation , some of which stemmed from his own 
personal iniative . Eden's attitude to Italy was unwavering . 
But since the possibility of war with Italy could not be 
faced , the pursuit of reconciliation was the only course open 
to the Cabinet - in the absence of an effective middle way. 
(ii) 
What was at the root of Italy's hostility? Was she not 
interested in fuller co-operation? 
Mussolini wanted to dominate the Mediterranean. He also 
liked •to capitalize on the British passion for bargaining; by 
keeping his prices high he robbed without discouraging the 
6 
customer .• He promoted better relations with Britain while 
concurrently planning bolder action. 
Mussolini demanded full public recognition for his Abyss-
inian conquest , de jure recognition with its implications of 
6. Simmering , p. 38. 
16. 
Moral sanction for Italian action. The exclusion of 
Abyssinia from the League would in effect imply such recog-
nition. Britain was the major League power and the former 
champion of sanctions. A British lead on de jure recognition 
was therefore necessary. Mussolini could keep the carrot of 
reconciliation dangling on the stick indefinitely by making 
de jure recognition the sine qua non for an Anglo-Italian 
settlement. 
Eden was the virtually unfettered Foreign Secretary in the 
Baldwin Cabinet. Italy realised his importance. This was 
reflected in Italian press attacks on him personally. 7 
Britain already had granted de facto recognition for 
diplomatic purposes in November 1936 by reducing the status of 
8 the Embassy at Addis Ababa to a Consulate. 
7. The intensity of Italian anti-British propaganda in late 
1936, the defusion of which was the occasion for the 
Gentleman's Agreement, may not be unrelated to the 
thwarting of Mussolini's apparently genuine hopes for 
de jure recognition from the September 1936 League 
Assembly, hopes raised imprudently by the pro-Italian 
League Secretary-General, Avenol, following the July 
volte on sanctions. 
See James Barros, Betrayal From Within, Joseph Avenol, 
Secretar -General of the Lea ue of Nations 1933-40. 
London 19 9, p.1 O. Hereafter Barros. 
8. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 C.P. 210(37) . 
17. 
Pressure on Eden to give the British lead on de jure recognition 
had been mounting in late 1936 and early 1937.9 Eden did not 
believe this would end Italian provocation. He rightly saw the 
key to estrangement in Italian Mediterranean power aspirations 
which were 'virtually irreconciliable ' with British interests. 10 
His personal antipathy for Italy had been deepened by the 
Ethiopian ar and was reinforced by continuing Italian propaganda 
attacks on Britain. He 'regretted the lost opportunity to pull 
him [Mussolini] up over sanctions.• 11 He was •convinced of the 
fundamental weakness of Italy . • Britain •must not run after her.•
12 
Italy was economically unsound , Britain should 'keep her lean 
by refusing credit facilities.• 13 The anticipated further British 
League and personal discrediting were important factors in his 
opposition. The final stab in the back of Abyssinia made the 
prospect additionally distasteful. This unpalatibility was high-
lighted by the Addis Ababa Massacre , the coronation fracas and 
9 . From Avenol , and Vansittart in the Foreign Office. 
Harvey , p . 16. 
10 . P . R. O. Cab. 23/89 C.I.D. 1332-B. 
11 . Harvey , p . 28 . 
12 . Ibid . 
13 . Harvey, p.26. 
18. 
14 the consequent boycott of British news in Italy. However, 
by at least March 1937, though he 'hated the business•, 15 
Eden had admitted that Abyssinian exclusion would be an ex-
pression of the realities of the situation; but that Britain 
could not afford to take the lead. 16 The condition in effect 
indefinitely cancelled out the possibility of getting the 
objective. A British lead was essential and therefore inevit-
able. Cabinet hopes for a plan to sweeten the bitter pill 
enough to tempt French support were attractive but elusive. 
Eden waited upon a possible decision at the May League 
Assembly by the Credentials Committee. 17 In the absence of 
Abyssinian representation in May the Committee could do nothing. 
Eden found the French and Dominions representatives predictably 
opposed to the matter being raised by member initiative in the 
Assembly. Poland did raise it but did not get a response even 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
I.R.R.A. Surve7 1937 (1) p.325. P.R.O. Cab. 23 88 13(37)4. 
Harvey, p.25. 
Ibid. 
If Abyssinian representatives presented their credentials 
to the League and were refused readmittance by the 
Credentials Committee, then the problem would be 
conveniently solved. 
19. 
from the States which had not taken part in sanctions. Reporting 
back to the Cabinet Eden rightly maintained that •only a strong 
British lead could have obtained the desired result and he had 
not had authority to take such a lead.' Chamberlain, presiding 
over one of his first Cabinet meetings 'regretted that proceed-
ings had taken that turn, but agreed that in the circumstances 
the Foreign Secretary had had no alternative but to take the 
course he did. 118 
The May League Assembly had siipped by without bringing 
de jure recognition any closer. Mussolini gathered his diplo-
matic wiles for a fresh onslaught for the September Assembly. 
(iii) 
Chamberlain replaced Baldwin as Prime Minister in May. 
Eden welcomed the change. Retrospectively he wrote that 
'before Chamberlain became Prime Minister I think it would be 
true to say that he and I were closer to each other than any 
other member of government, exchanging opinions on many Cabinet 
matters without disagreement.• 19 He claimed that he expressed 
delight at Chamberlain's 'I know you won't mind if I take more 
interest in foreign affairs than S.B. 120 The retrospect account 
does not give the full measure of his initial enthusiasm. 
18. P.R.O. Cab. 23/88 23(37)2; Barros, p.143. 
19. ~' p.501. 
20. Ibid. 
20. 
Harvey recorded that 'A.E. thought Chamberlain had the makings 
of a really great Prime Minister if only his health held out.• 21 
'Neville Chamberlain would be much more aggressive to the 
Opposition on home affairs ••• but on foreign policy there was 
nothing to divide them.• 22 
Close collaboration in a difficult personnel matter sealed 
the bond at the time of the leadership transfer. Chamberlain 
agreed that Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, 23 should be removed after a decent interva1. 24 
21. Harvey, p.34. 
22. Harvey, p.27. Ironically, Chamberlain's periodic gout 
seemed only to add to his zeal in pursuit of his foreign 
policy objectives whereas Eden's periodic flu and •dog-
tiredness' may have undermined his effectiveness at times. 
23. Sir Robert Vansittart (later Lord Vansittart), 
24. Eden wanted him removed to heighten his control over the 
Foreign Office and thereby strengthen his position with a 
Cabinet inclined to detect both dual control and Vansittart 
dominance in Foreign Office memoranda. 
Harvey, p.44 cf. Ian Colvin, Vansittart, London 1962, 
p.148, and The Chamberlain Cabinet, London 1971, p.29. 
Vansittart•s case illustrates the myth of Foreign 
Office unanimity against the Cabinet. Vansittart's 
retrospective claims that he was consistently opposed 
to the British policy of satisfying German grievances 
within a general European settlement have been recently 
questioned. Research has revealed a Vansittart supporting 
the abrogation of the military clauses of the Versailles 
Treaty and Germany's right to introduce conscription. 
Certainly in 1935 and 1936 he favoured colonial concess-
ions to Hitler. 
See Medlicott, Settlement. 
cf. Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Chi~s, The Diaries 
of Sir Henry Channon, London 19 7, p.115 
(Hereafter Chips). 
On Italy, Vansittart was generally, but not consistently, 
conciliatory. 
21. 
A minor altercation over Chamberlain's suggestion for the 
appointment of a non-diplomat to a diplomatic post was smoothed 
over by his acquiescence in Eden's insistence on a career-
diplomat.25 Chamberlain's candidate reflected his wish to 
penetrate the diplomats of the Foreign Office to increase 
'efficiency'; this was at the behest of his close advisors, 
arren Fisher of the Treasury and Horace Wilson, Chief Industrial 
Officer. 26 To this end intrigue was already working not only 
with Eden but against him in Fisher's and ' ilson's attempt to use 
Thomas, Eden's new Parliamentary Under-Secretary, as a Foreign 
Office watch-dog. 27 
25. Harvey, p.44. 
26. Sir iarren Fisher, Permanent Under-Secretary at Treasury 
and Head of Civil Service. 
27. 
Sir Horace lilson, Chief Industrial Adviser to H.M. Govern-
ment 1930-1939, seconded to Treasury for Service with the 
Prime Minister 1935. 
Leopold Amery, My Political Life, Vol.III, London 1955, 
p.225: 'Baldwin, as Prime Minister, was content to assume 
that his colleagues were competently discharging their 
duties. Chamberlain soon showed them that he was not 
merely a chairman in Cabinet, but a general manager who 
wished to know what his departmental managers were doing, 
to discuss their problems with them and to keep them up 
to work.' 
See below, Chapter 3. 
Avon, PP• 504-05. Thomas refused the role and reported 
't'he'°plot to his superior. However, though not watchdog, 
Thomas proved to be an efficient go-between for Horace 
ilson to and from the Foreign Office. 
22. 
Policy appraisals followed the change of leadership and a 
minor Cabinet reshuffle. These centred on ways of dealing with 
the dictators. As Eden had expected, he found the Prime Minis-
ter's views closer to his own than were those of other prominent 
Cabinet members. 
(iv) 
In the course of these appraisals, Eden was directed to 
present a memorandum on the probability of war with Italy. In 
February 1937 a new formula for defensive planning against Italy 
had been approved. It stated that ' Italy cannot be regarded as 
a reliable friend but in present circumstances need not be 
regarded as a probable enemy.• Therefore •no very large expen-
diture should be incurred on increasing the defences of the 
Mediterranean and Red Sea ports but at the same time some steps 
should be taken to bring them up to date and increase 
ff . . ,28 e 1.c1.ency. 
Eden wanted this formula revised . In his memorandum he 
concluded from a survey of specific Italian hostile activities29 
that there was 'clear evidence of a definite ill-will in the 
whole trend of Italian foreign policy , in view of which it is 
nec essary to c onsider in what circumstances it might impel the 
28 . P . R. O. Cab . 23/88 C. I.D . 1332-B. 
29 . Ibid. Eden provided an assessment of possible mitigating 
circumstances , a commentary on his perceptions of the 
vacuity of Italian propaganda. 
23. 
Italian government along a line of action leading to war with 
the United Kingdom.' Since he believed that the explanation 
for this ill-will was a Mediterranean power struggle, 'a 
position where policy control' in the ~editerranean lay in 
British hands was irreconciliable with 'present Italian aspir-
ations towards expansionism.' There was therefore 'a powerful 
argument for resistance to illegitimate Italian pressure' in 
view of 'the discomforts and risks inevitable in such a state 
of affairs.• Accordingly he suggested that the formula 'Italy 
cannot be regarded as a reliable friend and must for an indefinite 
period be regarded as a probable enemy, especially if she can 
count on the goodwill and potential support of Germany, and if 
the United Kingdom were involved in difficulties elsewhere' 
should replace the January provisions.3° 
Eden's formula was rejected by the Committee of Imperial 
Defence31 • Chamberlain provided a personal appraisal of the in-
ternational situation which minimised the possibility of Italy 
initiating a war. He stated that ideally preparations should 
be made for simultaneously fighting Germany, Italy and Japan. 
This was impossible because of agreed cautious defence expen-
diture and French weakness. Therefore , he suggested, any 
fears over Italy , especially the more likely joint fascist 
action , could only be realistically allayed by concentrating 
30. P . R. O. Cab. 23/88 C. I.D . 1332-B. 
31. This had replaced the Foreign Affairs Committee as the 
Cabinet sub-committee concerned with defence and foreign 
policy . 
24. 
on the greater German menace. Germany should be simultaneously 
cultivated as friend and safeguarded against as enemy by centring 
defence expenditure on her. 
Eden's wish to specifically place Italy on record as a 
probable enemy was opposed on the grounds of lack of precedent. 
His insistence that Italy be at least placed in the same category 
as Germany - in any case, he was informed, only informally by a 
process of exclusion recognised as a 'principle possible enemy' -
prevailed to the extent of agreement that Italy be excluded from 
a 1933 list of completely friendly powers against which defensive 
measures need not be contemplated. A theoretical ban on defence 
expenditure aimed specifically at Italy was therefore lifted. 
But any immediate significance of this step, initiated by 
Chamberlain, was offset by endorsement of Chamberlain's plan 
for concentration on Germany and by retention of the February 
expenditure corollary. 32 
Eden's and Chamberlain's readings of the Italian situation 
were similar . Both thought single-handed war unlikely. Eden 
played up the cases for independent Italian action, either 
'from despair' or from calculating on Germany to follow, a 
little more in the discussion of his memorandum than in the 
document itself ; but this was no doubt in response to the 
32. P. R. O. Cab. 23/88 29(37)3. 
25. 
minimisation of Italian menace per se by Chamberlain in relation 
to his estimation of the likely efficacy of his own German plan. 
But basically the two were in agreement. At the back of discus-
sion lay Eden's occasional pleas for more haste in rearmament; 
but Eden failed to define the independent position implicit in 
the document itself. At least by default he was a party to 
Chamberlain ' s general strategy. 
When the full Cabinet met to approve Chamberlain's plan , a 
letter from Drummond , the British ambassador in Rome , to 
Vansittart was tabled for discussion. Drummond through that an 
Italian conviction that Britain was harbouring thoughts of revenge 
over the Abyssinian humiliation was being used by an increasingly 
unbalanced Mussolini to work up anti-British feeling to war pitch . 
He believed that the granting of de jure recognition was the only 
wa:y out . Proposed Libyan reinforcements gave some substance to . 
Drummond ' s hysterical note . 33 
Chamberlain ' s plan that ' the real counter to Italy ' s dis-
quietening attitude was to get on better terms with Germany ' was 
accepted without dissension , but further reports34 reinforcing 
Drummond ' s case had produced enough unease in the Cabinet by early 
July to raise a question about advi s ability of a complete German 
orientation. 
33 . Avon , pp. 448-449. 
'f:"R:"o . Cab. 23/88 29(37)3. 
P . R. O. Cab. 23/89 30(37)3 . 
Reports from Lampson , British Ambassador to Egypt , 
Graham , former Ambassador and Pound , Commander-in-Chief , 
in the Mediterranean. 
26. 
Though both Eden and Chamberlain were predictably sceptical 
the majority of ministers took the Italian threat seriously. 
Fears of a •mad dog' act were evoked. On the one hand the 
possibility of all three services mobilising to meet the threat 
was suggested, but Eden maintained that 'it would be advantag-
eous' to relations if merely 'some sign' of 'our progress in 
rearmament' in the Mediterranean 'without being provocative' 
were displayed. On the other hand the sincerity of Italian 
fears was seriously entertained with the corollary of dissipating 
such fears with assurances of peaceful intent. Chamberlain 
testily reminded the Cabinet of the formula accepted at the last 
meeting. 'Very little could be done to improve relations with 
Italy.• 'He thought it had been generally understood that 
special steps in the Mediterranean were unnecessary' but as it 
was thought 'desirable to make some further display of strength' 
reconsideration by the Committee of Imperial Defence was in 
order. This was accepted.35 
The response of the Cabinet to Drummond's letter hard 
on the acceptance of Chamberlain's plan and reindorsement of 
February Mediterranean formulae suggests a lack of clear attit-
udes to Italy and the Mediterranean in the body of ministers in 
the months of June and early July. Certainly the commonsense 
appraisals of the Prime Minister were comforting in conditions 
35. Cab. 23/89 31(37)6. 
27. 
of tranquility where crisis was merely contemplated. They at 
least appeared more incisive than lengthy memoranda from the 
Foreign Office. Also formulae were only general planning 
operatives allowing for a certain flexibility of action. But 
either a confused or an automatic Cabinet participation in the 
construction of foreign policy formulae is evident; for 
Chamberlain had to remind the Cabinet of a relevant formula 
which had been accepted only at the last Cabinet meeting. 
The emergence of apparently aggressive intentions from Italy 
at this point might seem to be ammunition for the case Eden had 
presented in his memorandum. But Eden's sceptical response to 
the supposed crisis is not inconsistent with his memorandum's 
plea for 'adequate preparations for resistance' since he also 
believed that Italy was fundamentally weak and that a •mad dog' 
act was unlikely. A situation of earlier sceptical colleagues 
outplaying him on 'the probability of war with Italy', but with 
a significant shift of emphasis implicit in the serious response 
to the revenge 'paranoia' contained more eiements for Eden's 
annoyance than amusement. The reference of the defence question 
back to the Committee of Imperial Defence in a situation he 
himself was not inclined to take seriously and the reappearance 
of de jure recognition in a form where the Cabinet might be 
inclined to ditch its scruples was disturbing. 
(v) 
The two simultaneously contemplated lines of action, 
conciliation by peaceful assurances and consideration of possible 
28. 
retaliatory action at least kept options open; but with a hope-
ful emphasis on the first. This short term variation on the long 
term formula for Germany was reflected in the instructions given 
to Eden at the conclusion of the meeting. He was to make a 
statement in the Commons aimed at overcoming Italian fears of 
British vengefulness. Nevertheless his plans were endorsed for 
countering Italian anti-British 'propaganda' by the establishment 
of a British radio station at Cyprus to give retaliatory 'news• 
in the Near East, pending investigation of feasibility. 36 
On July 19th Eden made his friendly excursion into •open 
diplomacy' in the Commons. Grandi, the Italian ambassador, 37 
quickly responded in two ways. From Eden he requested an inter-
view with Chamberlain to hand him a friendly message from Mussolini 
which had been awaiting just such a 'propitious' moment.38 
36. Ibid. 
C.P. 185 (37) Eden: 'More positive steps should be taken 
than that of asking the Italians to desist. Without 
attempting to imi t ate the tone and method of Bari • •• 
essential ••• to ensure full and forcible presentation of 
the British view of events in a region of vital importance.' 
The Cabinet approved the appointment of a special officer 
to the News Department of the Foreign Office to deal with 
the matter and a Cabinet committee was set up to inquire 
into details for the Cyprus station. The plan eventually 
came to nothing. Yet Eden also tried to get B.B.C . cover-
age of Italian atrocities in Abyssinia watered down on the 
grounds that this was playing into Mussolini's hands , 
•strengthening him at home, as over sanctions earlier•. 
Harvey, p.34. 
37. Count Grandi, Italian ambassador, 1932-1939. 
38. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 C.P. 210(37) . 
29. 
The picture should now be fitted to the frame of the Gentleman's 
Agreement. To Hore-Belisha, the new Minister of War, 39 he 
suggested joint disclosure of the nature of Mediterranean 
defences to overcome Italian fears of British war preparations. 
The Minister welcomed the initiative, expressing the Cabinet 
view that Italy was 'not so much directing her measures against 
us aggressively, but in genuine apprehension.• The Chiefs of 
40 Staff agreed. 
The two initiatives disturbed Eden . They might be calcul-
ated to limit British Mediterranean defences to their post-July 
1936 low, to gain time to shore up Italian defences. For once 
Eden had the backing of Vansittart in his apprehensions. The 
two minuted Chamberlain at length on the proposed meeting, to 
some extent in response to Cabinet counter-pressure, 41 warning 
that 'while reciprocating advances we should be watchful in the 
42 
extreme.' Chamberlain was also sceptical. He thought Mussolini 
39. Formerly Minister of Transport in the Baldwin Cabinet. 
40. R.J. Minney (ed.), The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, 
London 1960, PP• 102-03. 
The translation of this enthusiasm into action was dilatory. 
By September, the position was still that an exchange of 
military information 'had been examined by the Chiefs of 
Staff who are ready to entertain it within certain limits.• 
P.R.O. Cab. 24/271 C.I.D. 1305-B. 
41. Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, had accused Vansittart 
of a 'suspicious mind in the matter.' 
Avon, PP• 452-7. 
42. ~' p.451. 
30. 
was simply going to once more protest his empty good intentions, 
'no designs in the editerranean', 'nor on Spanish territory'; 
but he agreed to see Grandi anyway •to find out whether there is 
any nigger in the woodpile., 43 
The private meeting between the Prime Minister and the 
Italian ambassador took place on July 27th. Grandi did n~t 
submit a copy of Mussolini's letter but intersperse~ a trans-
lation with his own comments and explanations~ lending colour 
to a hunch of Eden's that Grandi was being allowed to play the 
reconciliation game by ear. 44 In his report to the Foreign 
Office Chamberlain claimed to have 'dealt suitably' with Grandi's 
fears of British revenge and to have posed the necessary questions, 
especially about Libyan reinforcements, along the lines of diplo-
matic advice. Mussolini's desire for de jure recognition was 
central to the discussion, as anticipated by Drummond but strat-
egically omitted from Grandi's preliminary hearing with Eden. 45 
Chamberlain reported that he had replied that this would produce 
strong criticism in the country and 'could only be justified if 
H.M.G. could describe it as part of a great scheme of reconcili-
ation which would remove suspicions and anxiety and lead to a 
restoration of confidence ; ~6 but he expressed readiness for 
43. Failing, p.330. 
44. ~' PP• 452-3. 
45. Ibid. 
46. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 C.P. 210(37). 
31. 
conversations and had written Mussolini a 'friendly note•. 47 
The reciprocating note was not a surprise. 48 However, 
Grandi's curious delivery and Chamberlain's precipitate reply 
without Foreign Office vetting were unusual and at least looked 
devious. Eden did not ask for an explanation , claiming retro-
spectively that he thought ' there was no deliberate intention 
to by-pass me as Foreign Secretary , but that it was merely a 
slip by a Prime inister new to international affairs. 149 
This appears ingenuous . 50 Later , proportionately to Chamberlain ' s 
47. Ibid. 
48. Al l standard accounts give the impression that it came out 
of the blue. But Harvey wrote on 25th July , two days 
before the meeting , that a personal letter 'if sent by 
the Prime Minister (which would be more normal as 
Mussolini is Prime Minister) would , I fear , revive the 
legend that you alone are intransigent.' Harvey , p.414. 
Therefore the idea had been tossed around , though of 
course Eden woura--expect to be consulted on the content . 
49. ~ ' P• 457. 
50. Especially if set beside Chamberlain ' s strict observance 
of protocol on earlier occasions , for example , the 
Morgenthan letter . A message from Morgenthan , United 
States Secretary of Treasury , to Chamberlain , as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer , enquired what the United 
States could do in conjunction with Britain to avoid 
the danger of war. Eden and Chamberlain discussed 
the message , agreed on the importance of responding , 
the Foreign Office drafted a reply and Chamberlain 
signed it. See Harvey , p.17 . Of course , Chamberlain ' s 
position as Prime Minister was different . But the 
incident reveals that he was not new to Foreign Office 
protocol. 
32. 
shift of emphasis on Italy , the note became a source of 
resentment , pivo t al to the opening of Anglo-Italian conver-
sations, to which Eden would have appended conditions. 51 
It was a preliminary excursion into Prime Ministerial 
initiative , a first specific slight of Eden and the Foreign 
Office by Chamberlain. Chamberlain privately recorded that 
he ' did not show my note to the Foreign Secretary, for I had 
a feeling he would object to it . ,52 
At the end of July Eden went on holiday. Halifax was 
in temporary charge of the Foreign Office, a role habitually 
assigned to him in Eden's absence. 53 That there was no 
apparent tension over the Prime Minister's letter is shown by 
the unruffled contribution Eden made to the reconciliation 
preliminaries before his departure. At Chamberlain's request 
he emphasised the desirability of Italian ' open diplomacy' 
to reciprocate the July 19th assurances. 54 At the last 
discussion of foreign affairs before Eden ' s departure 
Chamberlain reminded the Cabinet 'of the exceptional pressure 
of work to which the Foreign Secretary had been subjected more 
or less continuously' , paying 'tribute to the skill, patience 
and ability with which he had dealt with the situation• , 
51 . Harvey , p.48. 
52 . Feiling, p.320. 
53. I . R.R.A . Survey 1937 (1) , p.337. 
Halifax was performing the sort of function Eden theoret-
ically had under Simon and Hoare in 1935. 
54. ~. p.454 . 
33. 
sentiments unanimously endorsed by the Cabinet.55 
(vi) 
On holiday Eden read in the newspapers of the friendly 
Italian reception to the personal note. Ciano56 termed the 
correspondence a 'great stride forward'.57 Reports of 
diplomatic progress, which was being personally supervised by 
Chamberlain, were forwarded to Eden. De jure recognition, as 
anticipated, was Italy's central desideratum. Italy was 
prepared to enter into negotiation in August but only if the 
Abyssinian problem was dealt with at Geneva in September.58 
The alternative she offered was at least another year of strained 
relations. Chamberlain hedged before the imperious demand, 
replying that this was a matter for the Foreign Secretary who 
unfortunately was absent.59 
Eden's apprehensions over conversations were recorded in 
replies to letters from Vansittart and Halifax. Chamberlain, 
Halifax reported, felt that dictators were subject to moods 
and therefore it was imperative to catch Mussolini in his 
present pliant state of mind. 60 The instant superficial 
55. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 32(37)6. 
56. Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister and Mussolini's 
son-in-law. 
57. The Times, August 7, 1937. 
58. Eden, p.454. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
34. 
efficacy of his devious initiative had whetted Chamberlain's 
diplomatic appetite. He had found enough substance in 
Mussolini's friendly overtures to hope for an 'Italian change 
of heart and attitude.• 61 Vansittart reported that the 
jubilant press reception62to the proposed conversations was 
due to hints dropped from the Cabinet. 63 Eden reflec t ed 
that 'the Italian government had skilfully committed us to 
conversations before we had decided what was to be their 
64 
content or how much we wanted them.• The 'we' no doubt 
illustrates Eden ' s identification with a small group of 
sympathetic immediate colleagues in the Foreign Office; it 
was clear that his Cabinet colleagues did~want conversations. 
Eden reported to Halifax that he could not approve de jure 
recognition , emphasising cooperation with France and suggesting 
a Mediterranean Pact as an alternative to pursuing a bi-
lateral detente . 65 
61. Cab. 23/89 34(37)8. 
62. The Times had termed it 'a turning point ' . The Times , 
August 3rd , 1937 . 
63 . Vansittart was not above such tactics himself . By 
March 1937 Eden had discovered that it was Vansittart 
and not the then Foreign Secretary Simon , who had 
issued a statement to newspapers that Eden had no 
authority to negotiate on his February 1934 state 
visit to Berlin . 
Harvey , p . 32. 
64 . Avon , p.454. 
65 . ~ ' p.457. 
35. 
So , by mid-August Anglo-Italian conversations seemed 
imminent, largely due to Chamberlain's personal exertion , as 
he retracted from scepticism for Italian assurances, and 
despite Eden's clear opposition. For the Cabinet and Chamber-
lain the problem of granting de jure recognition was apparently 
the only obstacle to be removed before reconciliation was 
possible. 
(vii) 
The problem of Mediterranean defence formulae had been 
settled immediately prior to Chamberlain's note to Mussolini. 
On July 23rd in the course of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
reconsideration of the Prime Minister's European plan, Chamber-
lain transformed Eden's non-provocative proviso into the 
formula 'doing nothing that could arouse Italian suspicions 
or be construed as provocative.• On July 28th the Chiefs of 
Staff presented their plans for dealing with the contemplated 
unilateral war that did not eventuate. 66 
However , bold action immediately followed Mussolini's 
steps towards reconciliation in an August upstep of submarine 
and aerial attac ks on Mediterranean shipping . Eden and 
Chamberlain prevailed over some reluctant ministers in a 
66. P.R.O. Cab. 24/271 C.P. 208(37) 213(37). 
36. 
decision to reinforce Mediterranean destroyer strength. 67 
But the immediate reinforcements were only temporary urgent 
stop-gap measures to protect British interests. 
Throughout tr.e rest of 1937 Cabinet focus periodically 
reverted to 'establishing ••• such military strength in the 
~editerranean as would permanently deter Italy' but the 
occasional reinforcements remained within the limits of 
Chamberlain's conditions of late July. The middle-way 
68 formula became a Cabinet commonplace. 
Since the Cabinet could not face the cost of Mediterranean 
strength both in terms of defence expenditure and Italian 
animosity, the alternative of 'establishing friendly relations 
with Italy', conditioned by the granting of de jure recog-
nition , became imperative. 
67. P.R.O. Cab. 24/271 C.I.D. 1305-B. 
68. c.f. E.M. Robertson, 'Introduction, iorld ar II , the 
Historians and their Materials' in Origins of ,'o rld ar 
Two, .acmillan 1971, and I.S.O. Playfair et al 
The :t, edi terranean and the t-.iddle East, Vol. 1, London, 
195. 
The assumption here that every attempt to detach 
Italy from the Axis after July 1937 was consciously 
accompanied by Mediterranean reinforcements is not 
founded on official documentation. If this is the case , 
then it is coincidental. 
37· 
2 . SPAIN AND FRENCH INITIATIVES 
(i) 
Was it necessary for Britain to challenge Italian 
intervention in the Spanish War? 
There was no alternative - if the Cabinet were to realise 
their desire for an Anglo-Italian settlement which would 
genuinely contribute to the pacification of Europe. But 
since the Cabinet were confident that Anglo-Italian reconcil-
iation was possible, the challenge was seen as undesirable, 
and unnecessary, provocation. A challenge to Italian inter-
vention in Spain at the least would lead to unwanted further 
Anglo-Italian estrangement - and it might lead to the war that 
could not be contemplated. Even Eden, who ideally longed for 
some offensive and who did not share the Cabinet's hopes for 
Anglo-Italian reconciliation, shrank from the direct challenge -
because he feared war. 
The Cabinet, therefore, were prepared to tolerate Mussolini's 
Spanish adventure. While they did not escape the ideological 
1 furore that the war provoked, they were generally comfortable 
1. In early 1937 Eden had suggested the use of the navy to 
supervise and control the approaches to every port in 
Spain. Hoare disliked the plan because he thought Britain 
was getting to the point where she was 'trying to stop 
General Franco from winning•. Some other Cabinet members 
were also 'very anxious that the Soviets should not win.• 
The idea was ditched on technical grounds. Middlemass and 
Barnes, p.1023 c.f. Avon, pp.435-6. 
Harvey, p.4o, in his entry for April 1, 1937, at the time 
of the Commons Debate over Bilbao, writes that 'Hoare put 
38 . 
in non-intervention. By March 1937, Eden was •still convinced 
that non-intervention was the right policy and that the alter-
natives of intervention or warning off the Italians last 
summer (1936] would have created grave risks of war where no 
British interests were involved. 12 
Non-intervention, however, did not mean indifference to 
British interests. 3 The response of the Cabinet to the August 
attacks in the Mediterranean had revealed that they would not 
tolerate any problems arising from the Spanish War that directly 
4 threatened British property. The Nyon Conference demonstrated 
this even more effectively, although in the planning stages there 
were also hopes that it would be the occasion for the exhibition 
of Italian •good faith' necessary to smooth the way to de jure 
recognition. 
The Cabinet tried to separate Mediterranean and Spanish 
problems in their attempts at bi-lateral negotiation with Italy. 
Where possible Span was banished to the London Non-Intervention 
his case badly in the ••• Commons last night and quite failed 
to disarm Opposition of their suspicions of his pro-Franco 
sentiments.• Eden publicly claimed to be indifferent to the 
nature of the victor but Harvey says that Eden personally 
favoured the Republicans. c.f. Hoare's view in Templewood, 
p.257. 
2. Harvey, p.24. 
3. R.I.I.A. Docs. 1937, p.49. 
4. See 2 (iv). 
Committee. 5 They had no ingenuous hope that the wranglings of 
the Committee6 would be effective in ending Italian intervention. 
Rather they saw the role of the Committee as containing the war 
and maintaining an equilibrium of forces. To this end it was 
relatively successful; but any real querying of Mussolini's 
aid to Franco had to be by direct consultation - or confron-
tation. 
The prospects for maintaining the separation of Mediter-
ranean and Spanish problems, however, became increasingly slim. 
Whereas in early 1937 the Foreign Office 'doubted whether on a 
long view it made much difference which side won because we did 
not believe Spain would ever depart from traditional aloofness 
and neutrality, although, on the short view, Franco's victory 
would be a fillup to the dictators'~ by September 'the hope 
5. In August 1936, on French initiative, a non-intervention 
agreement for the Spanish War had been signed by Britain, 
Germany, Italy, Russia, France and other powers. The 
first meeting of the London Non-Intervention Committee 
followed in early September. By October violations by 
Germany, Italy and Russia, in contrast to strict enfor-
cement by Britain and France, were obvious. 
On the origins on Non-Intervention, see D. Carlton, 
'Eden, Blum and the Origins of Non-Intervention', 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, PP• 40-55. 
6. The Committee spent its first three months in fruitless 
attempts to establish the responsibility for violations. 
They then turned to the subject which was to occupy its 
sessions for the duration of the war, the question of 
volunteers. 
7. Harvey, p.28. 
4o . 
that the victory of one side or the other would be purely 
Spanish' had wilted. 'With the duration of the civil war 
Franco's dependence on Italy had increased', Eden reported 
to the Cabinet, and therefore it •was felt that after the 
civil war ended Franco would not be able to control the 
situation without Italian assistance.• 8 
The French government had similar fears. The Cabinet 
needed French support on de jure recognition at the League if 
they were to meet Mussolini's sine qua non for an Italian 
settlement. The French view was that 'in principle we under-
stand all the advantages there are in not prolonging the current 
Ethiopian position at the League but on the other hand we find 
that the attitude taken by Italy on other questions does not 
permit the French government to take, or join, any initiative•. 9 
The •other questions• were predominantly Spain and intermittently 
propaganda. 
Violent anti-French propaganda had consolidated since 
France's swing to the Left in 1936 and her consequent retraction 
from friendly overtures towards Italy. The propaganda was 
8. P.R . O. Cab . 23/89 c.c. 35(37) 8, September 8. 
9. P.R.O. Cab. 24/271 C.P. 208(37) App. I, early September. 
'En principe nous comprenons tout l'interet qu'il ya 
a ne pas laisser se prolonger la position actuelle de 
l'Ethiopie a la Societe des Nations, mais d'un autre 
cote nous trouvous que l'attitude prise par l'Italie 
apropos d'autres questions ne permet au governement 
francais de prendre, on de se joindre, a aucune 
imitiation.• 
41 . 
linked with the ideological facade of Mussolini's Spanish 
intervention, a struggle against Bolshevism. However, although 
the sympathies of the heterogeneous coalition of the Popular 
Front were automatically directed to the Spanish Republicans, 
the dominant pacifism, absorption in domestic social change, 
fears of Germany and divisions in government ranks had kept 
these sympathies largely inactive. Further, the Socialist 
influence in the French government had considerably diminished 
by mid-1937· 
Nevertheless, the deteriorating military situation of the 
Spanish Republicans by the late summer of 1937 was a spur to 
French action. But because of her weakness, France was dependent 
on British support. The French government acquiesced in the 
British desire to include Italy in the Nyon consultation and in 
Italy's absence cooperated in working for her inclusion in the 
Nyon patrols. However, the success of Nyon, continuing Italian 
hostility and the obvious dangers to the French border from 
10 Franco's successes tempted the French government to either 
enforce non-intervention or, in the event of failure, suspend 
it - in collaboration with Britain. 
10. June 19, th~ capture of Bilbao; June 24, the recapture 
of Bru~~te; August 26, the surrender of Santander. 
(ii) 
In early September the French government suggested to the 
Cabinet conversations between the Mediterranean League countries 
at the coming Assembly on steps to protect Mediterranean shipping 
and air services, outside the Non-Intervention Committee. As 
Italy and Germany would not be able to participate because of 
their estrangement from the League, Eden suggested a meeting 
of signatories to a 1936 submarine protocol as an alternative. 11 
12 A plan for a meeting of Mediterranean powers at Nyon evolved 
from this initiative. 13 
NyonB success in halting Mediterranean 'piracy• 14 tends to 
obscure the hopes invested in it by the Cabinet in the planning 
stages. Cabinet hopes for immediate Anglo-Italian reconciliation 
died hard but were less well founded than in July. Mussolini had 
made it clear that if de jure recognition were not given at the 
League in September, conversations must lapse for another year, 
but it would be impossible for Britain to take the initiative 
at the League because of subsequent Italian provocation in the 
Mediterranean - unless Italy gave some sign of good f aith. 
11. P.R.O. Cab. 24/271 C.P. 208(37) September 8. 
12. A town close to Geneva, chosen not to antagonise Italy 
and Germany in their estrangement from the League. 
13. After an 'acrimonious dispute' with France. France wanted 
the Spanish Republican Government but not Italy. Britain 
wanted neither Spanish government and all Mediterranean 
powers including Italy. France agreed but insisted on 
Russia as well. Britain agreed, providing Germany was 
also asked. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 34(37) 3. 
14. Attacks fell by about seventy percent and almost totally 
at first. 
~-
The possibility of making the Nyon Conference a showcase for 
Italian goodwill, from which de jure recognition with French 
cooperation would easily follow, was therefore attractive. 15 
Cabinet consideration of the preparations for N1on 
coincided with diplomatic reports from Rome of renewed 
Italian hostility and the presentation by Eden of a memoran-
dum, The Present Phase in Anglo-Italian Relations and the 
Question of the Final Recognition of Italian Sovereignty in 
Abyssinia. 16 Eden made his case that 'if formal recognition 
were to be accorded', it must be 'presented as a contribution 
to the general pacification and appeasement of Europe and not 
as a nefarious bargain by which Italy gained our assent to her 
wrong doing in return for material advantages to ourselves.• 17 
Chamberlain had new faith in Italy after the apparent 
success of his July letter. He was 'anxious that the good 
effect of the exchange of messages' should not be allowed to 
fade. He agreed with the Cabinet majority that 'a good deal 
of the Italian animus against this country was really inspired 
by fear'. 'A change of heart and attitude' from Italy was 
•not too much to hope for.• He therefore suggested that the 
15. P.R.O. Cab. 13/89 C.C. 34(37) 8. 
16. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 c.P. 210(37) September 2nd. 
17. Ibid. 
44 . 
proposed Anglo-Italian settlement would genuinely contribute 
to 'the pacification and appeasement of Europe.• He thought 
that it would weaken the Rome-Berlin Axis and perhaps change 
Italy's attitude in the event of an Anglo-German dispute. 
In the long term he hoped that it might allow for a gradual 
reduction in defence expenditure. 18 
t d . 19 ht . . He suppor e a suggestion ta the British difficulties 
at GeneTa and the possibilities of the Nyon Conference for 
breaking the Abyssinian deadlock should be explained to 
20 Mussolini by Perth. The hope should be dangled before him 
that if Nyon were successful Britain •would do our best to 
clear up the position' over Abyssinia. Chamberlain acknowledged 
that Eden 'found difficulty in going quite so far as he ••• would 
like to go but hoped that we should be able to do everything we 
possibly could to recover the better atmosphere of the early 
21 
summer.• 
Eden expressedci.sapproval of such direct explanations to 
Italy. He claimed that they would be published and distorted 
into guarantees which the Cabinet was not in a position to make. 
22 In response to an exasperated comment that surely 'it would not 
18. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 c.c. 34(37)8. 
19. From Halifax. 
20. Sir Eric Drummond, Ambassador to Italy, had become 
Lord Perth. 
21. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 c.c. 34(37)8. 
22. From Oliver Stanley. 
be necessary to break off our relations with Italy on what 
was little more than a matter of procedure', he clearly spelt 
out his belief that Italy was 'unstable and untrustworthy' 
and therefore even if relations improved it could make little 
difference to defence planning. He directly confronted the 
Cabinet with the question: 'Assuming Signor Mussolini 
continued his present policy in the Mediterranean was it 
still suggested that our policy should be to turn Abyssinia 
out of the League?• 23 The reply24 summed up the Cabinet's 
consistent position. 'The answer must be in the affirmative 
but ••• the implementation of that policy had become impossible.• 25 
However, Eden made no attempt to translate his different 
attitude towards Italy into obstruction of Chamberlain's and 
the Cabinet's plans, indeed he actively contributed to plans 
for Italy's absorption into the Nyon patrols even if she failed 
to attend the Conference. He suggested that she be kept informed 
of developments to allow for her acceptance of the conclusions 
26 
without presenting her with a fait accompli. 
When Italy announced that she would not attend the Nyon 
Conference and that Mediterranean 'piracy' should be referred 
23. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 C.C. 34(37)8. 
24. From Inskip. 
25. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89. C.C. 34(37)8. 
26. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 C.C. 34(37)8. 
to the Non-Intervention Committee instead, Chamberlain had the 
alternative investigated.27 But it came too late to alter 
conference plans. 
Nyon was a success. Mediterranean attacks fell by seventy 
percent and almost totally at first. After a month Italy took 
her assigned role in the scheme of naval patrols that had been 
quickly drawn up in her absence. But the success of Nyon and 
Britain's failure to act on de jure recognition at the September 
League Assembly led Mussolini to withdraw from his friendly 
overtures of July and August. Chamberlain reverted to his 
earlier sceptical attitude towards an immediate Anglo-Italian 
settlement. On Eden's return from Nyon, Chamberlain warmly 
congratulated him on his success and confessed to being ' "fed 
up" with the Italians and not at all disposed to run after 
28 them.• 
If Eden's anti-Italian outbursts in Cabinet are set beside 
not only his failure to take an obstructionist position but also 
his active contributions to plans for Anglo-Italian reconciliation, 
the tensions are apparent in his quest for a middle-way between 
deadlock over Abyssinia and acquiescence in Italian demands. 
The translation of his anti-Italian sentiments into action was 
generally reduced to his taking a •serious view' of Italy's 
27• ~I p.464. 
28. Harvey, p.47, Cab. 23/89 36(37)2. 
~-
particular transgression of the moment, in hostile open 
diplomacy. His impotence was the more evident after his 
momentary p ersonal triumph at Nyon with its apparently 
efficacious, middle-way, resolute line. He therefore found 
tempting France's desire to transfer the momentum gained 
at Nyon to tackling the problem of preventing further Italian 
troop movements in Spain. The imminence of a rebel onslaught 
in Spain pushed by Italy and the Prime Minister's reversion 
to scepticism were additional spurs to temptation. 
(iii) 
In her post-Nyon meekness, Italy had given assurances 
that no more Italian troops would be sent to Spain. 29 But 
at Geneva in September both the French and British delegations 
received reports that Italy was about to dispatch large rein-
forcements. France suggested to Britain a joint representation 
to Italy to ask for an explanation. After consultation with 
Chamberlain, Eden was about to suggest that Britain act alone 
when Italy squashed the rumours. France then suggested a 
joint note to Italy proposing tripartite talks on non-inter-
vention in general. 
Reporting back to the Cabinet, Eden explained how he had 
'felt bound to agree to the joint approach' in order 'to avert 
29. !!.2.!:., p.474. 
~-
the risk that they [France] might open the Spanish frontier.• 
However, 'he himself' felt tripartite talks 'the best plan'. 
He believed that 'if tripartite talks failed the opening of 
the ••• frontier• was 'inevitable'. Chamberlain confessed that 
he •would have preferred ••• to conduct the negotiations alone•; 
but Britain •could not afford to put too much strain on the 
French government'. He thought •a favourable reply unlikely.• 30 
The Cabinet objected on two grounds. They agreed with 
Chamberlain that bi-lateral negotiation was preferable and 
suggested that tripartite talks moreover might be dangerous. 
Anglo-French cooperation at Nyon might have already strengthened 
the Rome-Berlin Axis. They predicted that further cooperation 
was bound to have that effect. Further, they disliked the new 
focus on Spain. They pointed out that the central question in 
the bi-lateral context was de jure recognition of Abyssinia. 
31 Spanish desiderata could only lead to further estrangement. 
Faced with Cabinet hostility, Chamberlain suggested that 
any possible damaging effects that a joint note might have on 
Anglo-Italian relations could be minimised by expressing it 
'in such a way as to extend the talks that had been going on, 
on a basis of perfect equality.• In addition he thought that 
30. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 35(37)2. 
31. Ibid. 
~-
Perth should be instructed to simultaneously present the 
tripartite talks to Ciano as a preliminary to bi-lateral 
negotiations. Perth should also secretly outline to him the 
'accidental' circumstances of the joint commitment. 32 
In effect these suggestions would kill any possible 
success from an Anglo-French approach to Italy. Since both 
Chamberlain and the Cabinet saw such an approach as foredoomed, 
their suggestions were consistent with their stands. Eden, 
however, 'did not share all the views expressed as to the effect 
of Anglo-French joint action.• But despite the obvious implic-
ations of Perth's instructions, he made no objections to 
Chamberlain's plan. 
Cabinet doubts over bringing pain into the direct negotiation 
arena led Chamberlain to emphasise the importance of getting 
'a start•. His post-Nyon cooling over an immediate detente 
with Italy and his closer cooperation with Eden were reflected 
in his guarantee that 'the Cabinet could feel assured that be 
and the Foreign Secretary would not let any opportunity slip 
for improving relations with Italy. He thought they realised, 
however, that it was impossible to separate the questions 
involved33 from Signor Mussolini's attitude to Spain and the 
Mediterranean. He thought that the Foreign Secretary fully 
realised and shared the feelings of his colleagues and that 
32. Ibid. 
33. Abyssinia. 
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the latter could endorse the Foreign Secretary's policy.• 34 
Cabinet wishes for a friendly joint note prevailed over 
French hopes for a stronger line. When Italy delayed her 
reply Chamberlain became increasingly worried about Anglo-
French cooperation. At the Foreign Office, however, Eden 
was anticipating the next line of action after the predicted 
negative Italian response. He believed that French inter-
vention in Spain was inevitable; he toyed with the idea that 
Britain should herself sell arms. He decided that even if 
Mussolini accepted talks, provided they were within the 
Non-Intervention Committee, Britain and France should agree, 
but nevertheless open the frontier.35 
Italy's tardy reply stiffly refused tripartite talks, 
demanded containment of Spanish questions within the Non-
Intervention Committee, and stated that Germany must be 
included in any talks. Ciano made no response to Perth's 
secret suggestions. 
Cabinet fears for a division of Europe into blocs were 
further coloured. Eden played vaguely with the idea of 
intervention. Chamberlain's fears over Anglo-French solid-
arity, already aroused by the Cabinet, were deepened . 
34. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 35(37)2. 
35. Harvey, PP• 48-49. 
51 . 
France had expected characteristic Italian evasion, not 
clearcut refusal. Stung into action, she now secretly proposed 
to the Cabinet a joint statement on withdrawals from Spain and, 
if that failed, 'temporarily authorising the transit of arms 
through our own countries and from our own countries.• 36 
Eden found the idea of intervention increasingly daunting 
as it became imminent. Harvey observed his hand-wringing: 
'He feels all the difficulties of allowing ourselves to be 
hoodwinked by Mussolini without any counteraction, and yet 
there is no effective counteraction ••• short of a direct challenge.' 
'Any sort of ultimatum to Mussolini to withdraw his volunteers 
would amount to ••• anything approaching war.,37 
The Cabinet unreservedly opposed the possibility of 
suspending non-intervention. The cries of the Italian apologists 
became shriller. The ideological preferences of some ministers 
36. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 C.P. 234(37), C.C. 37(37)3. 
37. Harvey, P• 52-53. 
38 
were unmasked. Eden backed up French data on Italian 
troop movements with his own 'particularly reliable source', 
castigated Italian intervention39 and defended French motives. 
Some of the Cabinet were 'rather horrified' at the working for 
a breach implicit in presuppositions 'casting aspersions on 
Italian good faith.' Chamberlain took a middle position. 
While agreeing with Eden on the validity of withdrawal 
proposals in themselves, 40 he shared the Cabinet's views that 
the French approach 'was deplorable if the objective was to 
get the volunteers out.' He suggested that France should be 
encouraged to announce her withdrawal scheme but if Italy 
refused Britain should 'reserve her position.' However, 'the 
French government could not be expected to keep the frontier 
closed indefinitely.• Eden agreed that Britain should not 
commit herself and suggested an alternative to avert the 
opening of the frontier, 'a temporary occupation of Minorea 
38. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 37(37)3. 
Ormsby-Gore claimed that France 'had indicated that 
[their] object was to get Great Britain and Russia 
together.' 
Oliver Stanley claimed that the Cabinet was 'drifting 
near to a position of [saying] that General Franco 
. must not be allowed to win.' 
39. Italian intervention was of a 'different character' 
from others. There were 'Italian generals whose 
photographs could be seen in any cinema in Europe.' 
4o. P.R.O. Cab. 23/89 37(37)3. 
53 . 
with the French coupled with an offer of international 
neutralisation.• 41 
The Cabinet hearkened back to Anglo-Italian conversations. 
Chamberlain again pointed out that 'the question of Spain was 
so linked with Abyssinia that at the League we could not 
secure the preliminary move that was essential to the opening 
of conversations.• He again reassured his ministers that they 
•could rely on the Foreign Secretary and himself to do every-
thing possible.• 42 
Faced with British reserved action, France delayed opening 
the frontier. Eden •agreed to be careful about Minorea so as 
not to give Mussolini any bad example.• 43 The problem of 
volunteers once again reverted to the Non-Intervention Committee. 
Italy accepted a new French plan and then retracted - dilatory 
tactics successful in deadlocking proceedings. 44 
Franco's anticipated onslaught was continually delayed. 
The French government in turn calmed down. By the end of 1937 
the Spanish situation was stalemate, to the extent that each 
side had consolidated its defensive position. The Cabinet once 
again settled back into non-intervention. 
41. Harvey, p.51. Cab. 23/89 37(37)3. 
42. Cab. 23/89 37(37)3. 
43. Harvey, p.52-53· 
44. 'The negotiations which continued in the Non-Intervention 
Committee until its end are long and drawn out, impos-
sibly boring, and add nothing to what had been said 
already.• Kleine-Alhbrandt, p.84. 
) 
In late October Eden invited Ciano to Brussels for 
'general discussions.' Mussolini refused. Vansittart 
'begged' Eden to send a 'personal note' to Ciano. The 
apparent efficacy of personal notes had been demonstrated. 
Eden refused. 45 In November Italy announced that she had 
joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. Anglo-Italian conversations 
seemed remoter than ever. 
(iv) 
The Cabinet tended to disregard France's difficulties 
and to haughtily expect her cooperation on any British 
initiative. In the event of a reluctant partnership on a 
French plan, they might either demand such conditions as 
would transform it practically into a British plan or limit 
its effectiveness by compromising explanations. 46 The prep-
45. On December 7, 1937 Italy officially withdrew from the 
League. Mussolini's sine qua non still held. The 
confirmation of the Abyssinian deadlock and Anglo-
French estrangement could still only be averted by 
full British recognition of the Italian conquest in a 
bi-lateral context. 
46. More widely, the Cabinet's attitudes to France were 
bound up with France's attitudes to Germany and Russia. 
1) French unwillingness to accept that 'adjustments• 
in Eastern Europe should be allowed to take their 
•natural' course. 
2) France's fears of Germany and her diplomatic engage-
ments in Eastern Europe to encircle Germany - a threat 
of dragging Britain into a war to maintain a status quo 
on which Britain was prepared to accept peaceful 
revision. 
3) The very fact that France would have to be rescued 
if she got into trouble made the Cabinet suspicious of 
every French move. 
arations for the Nyon Conference and the tone of the 
tripartite note are examples of the first tactic, Perth's 
private explanations to Ciano of the second. Eden hoped 
that the success of Nyon might represent a watershed in 
Anglo-Italian relations - a subsequent firmer stand by 
Britain, closer cooperation with France and ideally a 
challenge to Mussolini's Spanish adventure. However, what-
ever he may haTe personally contemplated in association 
with his closer colleagues at the Foreign Office, in Cabinet 
he was deferential as well as diffident. He cannot, therefore, 
be disassociated from any implications of the Cabinet's 
attitude to France because, 'whatever his personal feelings', 
he failed to define a position in decision making independent 
of his ministerial colleagues. After personally flirting with 
the French suggestion of intervention in Spain he had to revert 
to •making faces• at Mussolini. Chamberlain after Nyon was in 
a middle position in Cabinet, showing some sympathy for France's 
problems, less interest in an immediate rapprochement with Italy, 
unease at the joint approach with France to Italy and apparent 
4) Prejudice engendered by the innumerable Cabinet 
crises of the Third Republic had resulted in the 
downgrading of French advice, though during the 
Spanish Civil War the French Foreign Office was 
quite stable. Delbos was almost continuously 
Foreign Secretary and the Quai d'Orsay was con-
tinuously headed by Alexis Leger. 
5) France's alliance with Russia and British fears 
of getting involved in an Anglo-French-Russian 
bloc against the generally more palatable Germany 
and Italy. 
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confidence in Eden's abilities. Both the unease over 
France and the assurances about Eden rose proportionately 
to the upstep in intensity of Cabinet anti-French feeling 
when they were further frustrated in their quest for a 
friendly Italy by Nyon's success, Spanish 'diversions' 
from their central worry, de jure recognition of Abyssinia, 
and displays of apparent Axis solidarity - and consequently, 
anti-Eden feeling. 
3 . INTRIGUE AND THE 'SOFTER LINE' 
(i) 
After reading the Avon Memoirs, D.C. Watt speculated that 
Eden's resignation might have been 'the product of a personal 
quarrel rather than one over policy.• 1 While no account of the 
Eden and Chamberlain rift makes quite such a case, it is 
customary to emphasise the differences of age, 2 persona13 and 
professional4 background, temperament5 and interests.6 
1. Watt, Revisionist, p.133. 
2. Eden was 41, Chamberlain 60. 
3. Eden descended from the 'ruling houses' of Grey and Eden, 
Whig dynasties. Chamberlain was the younger son of 
Joseph, and half-brother of Austen. 
4. Eden attended Sandroyd, Christ Church Oxford, gaining 
first-class honours in the Oriental Languages School. 
Eden had never served in any ministry except the 
Foreign Office. Campbell-Johnson, p.266. 
Chamberlain was the Birmingham businessman •sought by 
company after company to strengthen their boards by 
his long headed counsel.' George, p.189. 
5. Chamberlain was dogmatic, partisan and 'grim'. 
Thompson, p.137-8. 
Eden was sensitive, irritable, diffident, witty and 
urbane. "Eden lived on his nerves and was highly strung", 
K. Young, Sir Alec Douglas Hume, p.49 (Hume was Chamber-
lain's secretary). 
6. Eden was an Oriental and Proustian scholar, journalist, 
writer, traveller; indeed the dilletante and intellectual, 
when he got the time. 
Chamberlain's interests were Beethoven, solitary walking, 
fishing, bird watching and 'civil duties•. 
Cartoons can often sum up these divergences better than 
lengthy description. Chamberlain was a caricaturist's 
dream - a small, sour man with a big umbrella. Eden's 
only physical attribute which cartoonists could play 
up was his slightly bucked teeth. He had the regular 
good looks popular at the time - the 'Noel Coward of 
58. 
Distinct Cabinet animosity towards Eden had dated from 
the preparations for Nyon. But intrigue of ministers and 
pressure on Eden by Chamberlain outside Cabinet meetings 
stepped up markedly after the Nyon success. A11 the essen-
tial elements for intrigue were operating from the time of 
the leadership transfer, 7 but there was an immediate reason 
for the post-Nyon upswing. 
Although Eden cannot be disassociated from the concilia-
tory preparations for Nyon despite his strong anti-Italian 
bias, he was happy to bathe in the glory of his renewed 
popularity after the conference. The laurels went to the 
8 
man who had apparently taught 'Muss• a lesson. The upswing 
in Eden's personal political capital disturbed Chamberlain 
and some ministers. It was perhaps feared that a repe tition 
Politics• (Charles Graves, quoted in Swinton [Coll. 
J.P. Margach], Sixty Years of Power (1)). In 1936 
one newspaper did its best to send Eden to Hollywood, 
circulating rumours of a lucrative film contract. A 
big director bad apparently discovered him and had 
sensed a great future for him as Clive Brook's double! 
Campbell-Johnson, p.129. 
7. See 2 (3). 
8. One prominent newspaper remarked: 'We seem to be 
back in the days of Baldwin when Eden was supreme 
minister of foreign affairs•, adding darkly: 
'As long as Eden is head of the Foreign Office we 
must be on our guard.' Campbell-Johnson, p.140. 
59. 
of the 1935 situation was imminent, where Eden's importance 
as a rostrum asset coupled with his muted hints of resignation 
had committed the Cabinet publicly to his divergent 'idealist• 
viewpoint. Their fears were not unjustified. 
(ii) 
Immediately after Nyon Chamberlain tried to stop Eden 
from addressing the Llandudno party rally. He argued that 
Eden was overworked and should not have to shoulder the 
additional burden of 'party hack'. This argument was not in-
consistent with Eden's private complaints but Chamberlain's 
persistance in efforts as disuasion after the Foreign Secretary 
had made clear his delight at the opportunity and Chamberlain's 
intention to address a meeting on foreign policy three days 
before made his motives obviously suspect. 9 
Chamberlain was worried not only about the attention that 
Eden was getting but also by his recourse to hostile 'open 
9 • .!!.2.a, P• 472, Harvey, p.47. 
At Llandudno Eden said: 'I am as anxious as anybody to 
remove disagreements with Germany and Italy, or any other 
country, but we must make sure that in trying to improve 
the situation in one direction it does not deteriorate 
in another. In such an event our last state might be no 
better or even worse than our former •••• We are in a period 
of storm and challenge when the hope is openly avowed that 
the variety of international anxieties will prevent 
effective resistance to unlawful courses in one sphere. 
This is a dangerous doctrine. No nation will profit by 
its practice in the end. There will be a Nem~sis.• 
Lloyd-George commented: 'First, what does he mean, 
and second, what do we do about it?" 
60. 
diplomacy' not in line with majority Cabinet opinion. Eden 
had refined the tactic of pointed discrepancy in his public 
statements as Lord Privy Seal under Simon's Foreign Secretary-
ship in 1935.w1i.en denied Cabinet acceptance of his policies 
Eden had taken advantage of Simon's unpopularity in both 
Cabinet and country. Chamberlain feared the revival of Eden's 
defiant playing to the gallery. At the opening of Parliament 
in November, Chamberlain was unable to participate in the main 
foreign policy statement because of gout. Eden decided to take 
advantage of bis absence to speak with •a freedom I seldom 
used.' It is not clear if Chamberlain was aware of his reso-
lution but in any case he sent a message to J.L.P. Thomas to 
request Eden 'not to say anything to upset the dictators.' 
10 Thomas did not deliver the message until after the speech. 
There were occasional tensions in the formulation of 
diplomatic correspondence. A more complex variation on the 
July letter occurred in late September. Eden and Vansittart 
had drafted a telegram to Washington on economic action in the 
Pacific. Chamberlain rewrote the last paragraph less enthusias-
tically. Eden did not see Chamberlain's final draft until 
after it had been sent. He promptly dispatched another 
telegram to impress his attitude. 11 
10. Harvey, p.56; !!2.!!,, p.506. 
11. !!2!!, p.534. Harvey, pp.48-49: 'Here again is a 
divergence between A.E. and P.M. as latter is strongly 
opposed to any sort of economic boycott in the Far East. 
A.E. on other hand would welcome joint initiative.' 
See below 5 (1). 
61. 
A more openly aired divergence can be seen in Eden's 
occasional pleas for 'rearmament•. Eden wanted to be 
'foreign secretary when the country was rearmed'. He dated 
this at 1940; 12 but his dispute with the Cabinet related to 
the place of rearmament rather than the degree. He emphasised 
the tardy execution of existing defence plans. On one occasion 
Chamberlain attributed Eden's pressure to his recurring flu. 
HarTey•s account gives a consolitary epilogue and interprets 
Chamberlain's response as sincere. 13 Avon does not mention 
the incident. 14 Discussion was not always so fruitless. In 
an interview following the opening of Parliament Chamberlain, 
ignoring Eden's speech completely, complained that the Foreign 
Office never made a genuine effort 'to get on with the 
dictators.• Eden retorted that this was 'both useless and 
impossible without strong armament.• Chamberlain called a 
•small meeting of ministers' to hear Eden's complaints. 
The result shows that Eden's viewpoint was not always totally 
ineffectual. A decision was made to purchase anti-aircraft 
guns abroad. 15 
12. Harvey, p.32; Thomas Jones, p.371. 
13. Harvey, p.63. 
14. !!2!!,, pp.489-501. 
15. Harvey, p.58. 
62. 
Eden, however, having gained an advantage, did not 
transform the occasional plea into an all-out assault on 
cautious defence planning. In Cabinet after the Halifax 
visit to Germany Eden casually remarked that •progress with 
Germany might well depend on rearmament.• Chamberlain took 
him up, reminding him of the recent anti-aircraft guns 
decision: 'When the Foreign Secretary spoke of success 
depending on our rearmament programme, did he mean merely 
the completion of these programmes, or their intensification? 
The latter could not take place except by revoking the 
decision not to interfere with civil industry, which he assumed 
at the present time was out of the question.• Eden replied 
that he •referred to the programmes rather generally, and had 
16 
not mentioned the pace or degree of rearmament.• 
The muted tenor and the lack of candour in the expression 
of divergences suggest that Eden and Chamberlain were acutely 
conscious of their differences but that neither wished to work 
for an open breach while there were alternatives, however 
complicated and underhand. 
(iii) 
There were rumours of a rift after Nyon. 17 Thomas Jones 
16. P.R.O. Cab. 23/90 C.C. 45(37)5. 
For the latest information on British rearmament 
in the thirties, see F. Loghlan 'Armament, Economic 
Policy and Appeasement. Background to British Foreign 
Policy, 1931-37' in History, Autumn, 1972. 
17. Especially in the continental and American press. One 
recorded some of these, but queried them because Chamberlain 
had been paying Eden compliments. 18 We have already noted 
Chamberlain's backing of Eden in increasingly acrimonious 
Cabinet disputes. There is, however, something of the tone of 
apologist and supervisor in Chamberlain's 'the Foreign Secretary 
and himself', 'he thought that the Foreign Secretary would 
agree' statements. Often Eden was ominously silent and then 
belatedly critical in Cabinet debates. Chamberlain's tone 
might be patronising but Eden could hardly afford to be seen 
openly disputing with Chamberlain in Cabinet meetings in view 
of majority Cabinet hostility. Eden preferred to write letters 
stating his cases, both before and after 'unsatisfactory' private 
interviews. On Chamberlain's part there may have been the hope 
that compliments and solidarity might lead to concessions. 
Eden certainly thought that his concessions might 'put him 
in a stronger position for later.• 19 But in the case of the 
Halifax visit to Berlin this was largely a rationalisation 
after the event. Eden opposed the visit on the grounds that 
the proposed discussion basis was •weak' and the nature of 
London correspondent cabled the New York Times that 
before leaving for the Brussels Conference Eden 
offered resignation. 
18. Thomas Jones, p.369. 
19. Harvey, p.60. 
64. 
20 the invitation meant 'going to Canossa.• The precipitancy 
of Chamberlain's and Halifax's preparations in Eden's absence 
at Brussels was calculated to stall his known opposition. 
21 Presented with the newspaper leakage, the possibility of a 
fresh German grievance and guarantees on the informal nature 
20. Harvey, P• 59. 
21. For the fascinating details of the press leakage, 
see Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and 
Germany 1936-39, for example P• 130, this from the 
Manchester Guardian Archives: Voigt to Crozier, 
17 November, 1937: 'It is generally assumed that 
Poliakoff (the journalist who got the news scoop) 
got his information from the Italians. But that 
is not so. He got it from a high ranking officer in 
the Foreign Office.• 
Claud Cochburn in the scurillous The Week used 
it as an occasion to invent the Chieden Set. Of 
Eden's part, he wrote: 'Mr Eden thereupon (i.e. 
on Monday,November 8th) resigned. Since nobody 
except the members of the Cabinet heard about it, 
it remained, like so many of Mr Eden's nervous 
gestures, "a political event without consequences." 
Nevertheless, he did resign, and the newspapers 
published the fact that he was reported to be 
"simply furious." Then he withdrew his resignation, 
and satisfied himself with the nconclusion" that 
Lord Halifax when he returns is to report to Mr Eden 
as Foreign Secretary first, instead of reporting to 
the Cabinet.' 
Patricia Cochburn, The Years of the Week, 
London 1968, PP• 242-43. 
of the proposed discussions, Eden retracted his opposition. 22 
Cabinet intrigue fed rumours of a breach. Hoare and Simon, 
the two discredited former Foreign Secretaries were the main 
intriguers, aided by Swinton. 23 In early November Hoare and 
Simon visited a prominent newspaper columnist separately to 
intimate that Eden's minor ill-health revealed the strain 
24 he was under and, unable to cope, he would soon have to go. 
Intrigues like this were responsible for the rumours that 
Eden's flu after the Brussels Conference was an 'indisposition 
d . 1 ti . . . , 25 ip oma c in origin. 
Smear campaigns usually contain an element of truth. 
It can be suggested that Eden's physical state limited his 
26 
effectiveness. In 1935 Eden had had a heart attack. In 
22. The Memoirs of Halifax and Eden give different 
impressions of the background to the visit. Halifax's 
view assigns to Eden an active role in its promotion. 
Eden's account rejects this. Harvey's account fills in 
the details, as above. 
23. Harvey, p.61. 'Hoare had added that as time had shown 
that Hoare-Laval proposals had not been so wrong, he 
was now prepared to take F.O. again.• 
24. Ibid. 
25. Campbell-Johnson, p.142. 
26. An aeroplane carrying Eden from Leipzig to Cologne 
had run into a tropical storm. Eden, already 
exhausted by the rush from capital to capital, the 
endless dispatches and receptions of his "inter-
national statesman" status broke down, had a heart 
attack, and was ordered to bed, thus missing the 
Stresa Conference. 
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April 1937 he had expressed his hankering for the life contem-
plative but 'resignation would be letting Chamberlain down 
with a bump.• 27 The administrative framework of the Foreign 
Office placed great pressure on the physical capacities of 
the men at the top28 while by 1937 the additional burden of 
a Commons latterly more harassing to the knight-errant manque 
denied the Foreign Secretary his inclination to devote him-
self solely to diplomatic correspondence.29 He was not 
aided in the House after May by the abrasive Chamberlain. 30 
Public championship of personally distasteful policies, 
private bankruptcy of acceptable alternatives and harassment 
for apparent intrans~gence, despite ostensible deference, 
heightened the tension. The apparent moment of triumph at 
Nyon, however false, was important. The diplomatic failures 
of late 1937 were felt hard, especially the Brussels Conference, 
since Eden was heavily committed to selling the advantages of 
Anglo-American cooperation. 31 Both Harvey and Thomas Jones 
used the phrase 'dog-tired' to describe Eden at the beginning 
of the late 1937 parliamentary session. Photos taken at the 
time show an Eden thin and dejected.32 
Chamberlain was aware of the intrigues. There is no 
27. Harvey, p.82. 
28. See Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession, London, 1938 
passim. 
29. Harvey, p.32. 
30. Thompson, p.139. 
31. See below 5 (1). 
32. Thomas Jones, p.371; Harvey, p.48. 
evidence that he either tried to stop them or was a party to 
them. Horace Wilson assured J.L.P. Thomas that there was no 
question of personal jealousy or hostility on Chamberlain's 
part. Chamberlain, he claimed, was personally devoted to 
Eden, but genuinely thought him wrong and hoped to save 
him from error, eventually.33 Harvey's assessment is similar. 
If this is an accurate view of Chamberlain's sentiments, 
then Eden privately was less generous, complaining of Chamber-
lain's age and fascination with dictators. 34 Any prospects 
for Chamberlain's retirement, however, were the less welcome 
because of the lack of a palatable alternative.35 
(iv) 
McLeod, working from the Chamberlain diaries, has 
attributed to Eden a •softer line' on de jure recognition of 
Abyssinia by late 1937. After the failure of Halifax's visit 
to Berlin the atmosphere between Eden and Chamberlain cleared 
up. Disappointments over Germany saw Chamberlain back on the 
Italian track again - and Eden concurred. 
In late November the question of Anglo-Italian relations 
33. Harvey, p.61; Thompson, p.145. 
34. Harvez, p.48. "Eden said •au fond' Prime Minister had a 
certain sympathy with dictators whose efficiency appealed 
to him.• 'Sixty was too old for a Prime Minister.• 
35. Except, of course, himself, see Harvey, p.32. 
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was again raised in the course of Anglo-French consultations. 
Eden and Chamberlain prevailed over French qualms. They agreed 
to add propaganda to the list of British desiderata. They 
placated France's wish to participate by undertaking to inform 
Italy that the proposals for conversations came as a result 
of Anglo-French consultations and that France must be brought 
in at •an appropriate stage.• All agreed that de jure 
recognition could only be granted by a League decision. 
Chamberlain confessed that this \'•as now impossible. 36 
Eden, although apparently pursu5.ng Anglo-Italian convers-
ations, at the same time persisted wit~ his hostile 'open 
diplomacy'37 and continued to hope for n further reversal of 
Mussolini's fortunes38 which would brinf. the Cabinet to its 
senses. In the last Cabinet reference t o Italy for 1937 he 
'reported that the Foreign Office had received a number of 
reports from different sources giving an account of the internal 
difficulties in Germany and Italy. The Germans appeared to be 
very much aware of the Italian difficulties. The difficulties 
referred to were mainly of an economic and financial character. 
This was a factor to be borne in mind.,39 
36. P.R.O. Cab. 23/90 c.c. 45(37)5. 
37. I.R.R.A. Docs. p.247 ff. November 1, 1937: December 20, 
38. Harvey, p.67. 1937. 
39. P.R.O. Cab. 23/90 c.c. 46(37)2. 
This, however, largely acted as a spur to Cabinet fears of a 
•mad dog' act, the Chiefs of Staff reporting that •such a 
situation may contain elements of danger, since if the 
economic situation deteriorates much further Mussolini may 
prefer to gamble on the results of external adventure rather 
than face economic collapse. 140 The need for the •renewal' 
of conversations was seen as the more urgent for this. 
Mussolini's official withdrawal from the League was even 
more effective in activating the Italian apologists in the 
Cabinet. 
On December 2nd, Eden reported the results of the Anglo-
French consultations to Grandi. Grandi insisted on, and Eden 
kn 1 d d th . t f d . •t• 41 ac owe ge, e impor ance o e Jure recogni ion. After 
Christmas the tardy Italian reply to Eden's talks with Grandi 
impressed that if conversations were to start de jure recog-
nition could not be left out. 42 
For Eden, it was a time for reappraisals. Chamberlain 
and Eden were now closer, the reconciliation marked by a 
number of wooing gestures. Eden persuaded Chamberlain to 
speak first in the Commons on Foreign Policy on December 22nd 
and expressed satisfaction at his efforts. 43 Ironically, the 
40. P.R.O. Cab. 23/90. C.P. 296(37). 
41. ~. p.474-5. 
42. Harvey, p.67. 
43. Harvey, p.66. 
Italian press, with a new official policy of less unfriendli-
ness towards Britain, used this occasion as an initial sally 
into the tactic of making a pointed discrimination between 
Eden's and Chamberlain's statements, contrasting the 
December 22nd speech with Eden's recent hostility. 44 On 
his part Chamberlain again broached the matter of Vansittart•s 
removal, accepting Eden's proposed alternative, Cadogan. 45 
In an atmosphere of 'closer• agreement about foreign 
policy46 and consequently a closer relationship as colleagues, 
Eden and Chamberlain were able to discuss the problem of 
de jure recognition less heatedly. 
Eden attempted to see the Cabinet's point of view on Italy. 
Faced with Italian withdrawal from the League and renewed 
friendly intimations from Mus s olini but an implacable stand on 
de jure recognition, Eden confessed to Harvey that he had to 
be careful not to let his personal prejudices colour his 
attitude. 'He regarded Muss as anti-Christl' but •we might 
be in danger of cutting off our nose to spite our face by too 
negative an attitude.• 47 He directed the Foreign Office to 
44. I.R.R.A. Survey 1937 (1), p.329. 
45. Harvey, p.64. 
46. !!2.!l, p.547. 
47. Macleod, PP• 211-212. 
71. 
draw up lists of desiderata which could be demanded in 
return for de jure recognition in the event of a decision to 
go ahead independently of the League but in conjunction with 
the French. On December 31st two proposals were presented -
either to give recognition in return for a 'hard bargain' or 
as a gesture, coupled with a joint Anglo-French declaration 
of solidarity in the Mediterranean and an invitation to Italy 
to negotiate. 48 Eden sent the proposals to Chamberlain - with 
his doubts about the expediency of both and his dislike of the 
first in 'setting high moral principles against material 
advantages.• 49 Chamberlain replied in a friendly letter. He 
explained that he thought that the first contained possibilities 
of general appeasement which would provide the justification 
for de jure recognition whereas the second would mean 'giving 
awa::, our best trump card and we should draw on ourselves a 
condemnation more scathing than that aroused by the Hoare-
Laval Pact. ,5o 
48. Harvey, p.65. 
•we could never expect to get Mussolini to 
cooperate sincerely with us or in the League of Nations, 
whatever we gave him, as his whole system was hostile 
to ours ••• in such a situation it became a question of 
expediency, whether we really must buy Mussolini off 
or whether we could afford to let matters drift.• 
49. Harvey, p.67; Macleod, pp. 211-212. 
50. Macleod, P• 211-212. 
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Such an exchange was possible because of genuine attempts 
on both sides to work out a personal deadlock clearly rooted in 
different emphases in foreign policy towards Italy. Eden's 
concessions, however, had been the greater - he had attempted 
to come some way to meet the Prime Minister. But the diver-
gence still stood in the friendly correspondence. Eden's case 
of September had not altered: 'if formal recognition was to 
be accorded• it must be 'presented as a contribution to the 
general pacification and appeasement of Europe.• Chamberlain, 
as in the earlier discussion, emphasised that Eden's •nefarious 
bargain' would contribute to 'the genera l pacification and 
appeasement of Europe.' For Eden, de jure recognition was so 
distasteful that when he finally contemplated it outside the 
'impossible' League context, the giving-way, if at all, had to 
be complete, a gesture hopefully dignified enough to be above 
moral criticism and hopefully strong enough to be above inter-
pretations of British weakness - but in any case he thought 
both alternatives 'inexpedient.•51 
Macleod's •softer line•, therefore, is less soft than it 
looks. Rather it was a temporary attempt by Eden after a time 
50. Ibid. c.f. Eden's other plan for 'idealist• concessions -
to Germany. If Hitler was to get colonies, there should 
be no deal - he should be given all ex-German colonies 
for a general settlement. 
Harvey, p.63. 
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of estrangement not only from prominent Cabinet members but 
also from Chamberlain to come to terms with their policies, 
since he himself had no alternative to offer, except drift. 
74. 
4: AMERICAN INITIATIVES, ITALIAN CONVERSTIONS AND RESIGNATION. 
Eden was heavily committed to the idea of American action 
in Europe in his search for a middle way to 'face the dictators•. 
Chamberlain was sceptical of United States' initiative. 'The 
power that had the greatest strength was the United States of 
America' but 'it would be a rash man who based his calculations 
1 
on help from that quarter.• In January 1938 an American plan 
for solving the 'world crisis' was posed as an alternative to 
an Anglo-Italian settlement. Both Chamberlain's championship 
2 
and Eden's objections to the latter consequently hardened. 
On January 3rd, 1938, Eden left for a short holiday in the 
south of France. He intended to go on to a League Assembly 
where he would consult France on the two late December proposals 
for de jure recognition. Chamberlain was in charge of the 
Foreign Office in his absence. On holiday, Eden wrote to 
Chamberlain: 'I do hope that you will never for an instant 
feel that any interest you take in foreign affairs, however 
close, could ever be resented by me. I know, of course, that 
1. P.R.O. Cab. 23/90 C.C. 46(37)10, late 1937• 
When Roosevelt had made his famous declaration of October 
5th, 1937 that "when an epidemic of physical disease 
starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a 
guarantine of patients in order to protect the health of 
the community against the spread of disease." Chamberlain 
publicly responded favourably, was privately facetious, and 
wrote that 'it is always best and safest to count on nothing 
from the Americans but words.• Feiling, p. 325. 
2. Watt, Personalities, on Eden's attitude to the United States: 
'One could not find a stronger illustration of the basic 
75. 
there will always be some who will seek to pretend that the 
Foreign Secretary has had his nose put out of joint, but that is 
doctrines and assumptions of English pan-Anglo-Saxonism -
the unquestioning identification of British and American 
leadership, the naive assumption that British leadership 
would be welcome and acceptable, the identification of 
Anglo-American hegemony with the achievements of universal 
peace, and the optimistic idealism about the influence of 
a united Anglo-American opinion as a deterrant against the 
use of force to upset the world 'status quo.• 
c.f. Lawrence Pratt, 'The Anglo-American Naval Convers-
ations on the Far East of January 1938 1 , International 
Affairs, October 1971 (hereafter Pratt), p. 755. 
'Eden believed, like so many pro-American British, in 
an Anglo-American hegemony, based on a monopoly of sea 
power, raw materials and commerce, and thought that, 
after England had composed its differences with Hitler, 
peace based on the imperial status quo c ould be imposed 
in the Far East and the Mediterranean, if necessary by 
force.• 
American and British cooperation had predominantly focused 
on the problems of Japanese action in the Far East. 
Britain had prepared her defensive planning since 1933 
on the assumption of war with Japan, but had the Japanese 
merely consolidated their position in Manchuria, they might, 
in the British view, have eventually placated by the Chinese 
by the benefits of economic development and the establish-
ment of law and order. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 
July 7th and 8th 1937 ended that possibility. The Cabinet 
did not doubt Japan's guilt; but they took a lesson from 
the Manchurian crisis and resolved not to put Japan in the 
dock. Eden upheld the idea that a conference backed by 
the United States might bring about an armistice in the 
Far East and further, by establishing a close consultative 
bond, isolationist America might be then inviegled to turn 
her attention to Europe. In general Eden had Chamberlain's 
backing on joint initiative in the Far East, but both 
doubted the value of sanctions unless backed by force -
which they would not contemplate. The cabinet was wary 
but hopeful. Since Eden was heavily committed to Anglo-
American cooperation, publicly as much as privately, the 
failure of the Brussels Conference represented his worst 
diplomatic failure of 1937. Brussels accomplished nothing 
save antagonising Japan and, if anything, worsening the 
Chinese situation. Anglo-American naval conversations were 
then planned for January 1938. Eden was intending to 
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of no account beside the very real gain of close collaboration 
between Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister which, I am sure, 
is the only way that Foreign affairs can be r un in this country.,3 
holiday leng thily over Christmas and the new year in 
Madeira but changed his plans 'in view of forthcoming 
negotiations with U.S •••. it was essential that he should 
be in London when U.S. Naval representatives arrived ••• 
as he said, this development of Anglo-American relations 
was the most important thing that had happened and what 
he had been working for for years.• (Harvey, P• 65). 
The conversations transpired immediately prior to the 
emergence of the Roosevelt proposal. Pratt comments: 
'In view of the usual historical assumption that it 
was America who finally retreated from cooperation in 
these weeks, ihe exchanges of January 10-11 are of some 
interest. In truth, it had been Britain which had 
been unable to accept Roosevelt's timetable of escal-
atory steps. Its position in Europe and the Mediterr-
anean was so dangerous that it was incapable of serious 
intervention elsewhere.• Pratt, P• 757. Roosevelt's 
enthusiasm for action in the Far East was ammunition 
for Eden's case on Anglo-American cooperation Europe. 
In fact, however, the dominant scepticism of Chamberlain 
and the Cabinet towards the January Roosevelt plan was 
the more accurate reading of the situation. 'The value 
of Roosevelt's initiative [to the American government] 
lay in the anticipated after-effects on American 
opinion of its expected inevitable failure.• 
Watt, Personalities, p. 45. 
3. Macleod, P• 213. 
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On January 12th and 13th the Foreign Office received 'A 
Most Secret Message' from President Roosevelt, a plan for a 
world discussion on the underlying causes of the 'international 
crisis.• 4 Roosevelt asked for a British opinion of the plan 
by the 17th. Cadogan5 discussed the proposal with Chamberlain 
and drafted a reply. This revealed that Britain was about to 
discuss de jure recognition with France, with a view to a 
general Italian settlement. It suggested that the American plan 
would cut across this and therefore the United States might 
wish to postpone its plan pending European developments on 
British initiative, but it added that if the United States never-
theless wished to go ahead with its plan, it would have full 
4. Roosevelt proposed 1) a general appeal and invitation to 
all governments which, if accepted, would be followed by 
2) the appointment of a drafting committee of U.S.A. and 
some minor powers (Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Turkey, 
Hungary, Yugoslavia) to draw up an agenda, followed by 
3) submission of the proposals to all powers. 
5. Owing to a press leakage that Vansittart was about to 
get a 'high honour• and an Embassy, it was decided to 
bring out the announcement of his new appointment as 
'Chief Diplomatic Advisor' with the New Years Honours 
List in which he got a G.C.B. With Vansittart 'kicked 
upstairs' to an honorary advisory post, the job of 
chief permanent official in the foreign office, 
Permanent Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, went to 
Cadogan, as Eden and Chamberlain had arranged. (It 
was a foreign office joke that Vansittart, well pleased 
with his post and misunderstanding its 'pensioning off' 
status, had been himself responsible for the laudatory 
press coverage of his transfer). Harvey, p.66. 
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British backing. Chamberlain cut the addition and dispatched 
the amended version. A copy was simultaneously sent to Eden, 
giving him time to telephone his views before the final deadline 
of the 17th. Cadogan privately telephoned Eden to come home, 
explaining that there were secret new developments which could 
not be divulged over an open line but that there was a summary 
of them coming. 6 
At leisure, in consultation with Lloyd George and Winston 
Churchill, Eden's 'instincts' against de jure recognition had 
a 
been 'fortified'.7 Eden hurried back. However, at Marsailles 
he missed his letter, air services were out of action and the 
boat and train journey held him up. Increasingly agitated, he 
finally reached London on the evening of January 15th. He 
immediately decided that Britain must accept Roosevelt's plan, 
subject to some amendments. 8 
6. Harvey, pp. 67-68. Colvin, Vansittart, P• 181 
'Sir Alexander (Cadogan) tells me that he did his best 
to alert Eden before Chamberlain's reply was sent.• 
7. Harvey, P• 70, .!!£.!, P• 547-8. 
8. Harvey, P• 70, Avon, PP• 548-557. 
Avon, P• 533: •i-1e1t that I should have been summoned 
to"1;ondon or consulted by telegram, before any reply 
was sent. Roosevelt had asked for an answer by 
January 17th. It was now only the 15th.' 
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Early on the 16th, 9 Roosevelt telegraphed that he was 
disappointed with the British reply but would hold up his plan 
'for a while• and write to Chamberlain. Eden immediately tele-
graphed Washington. Chamberlain, he claimed, had brought him 
back for consultations. He expressed his hopes that Roosevelt 
did not regard Chamberlain's reply as negative , as this was 
not the intention. 
In the morning he saw Chamberlain. Chamberlain was friendly 
but objected to Eden's telegram and refused to send a further one 
until after he had received Roosevelt's letter. He emphasised 
that he believed that a real settlement with Italy was imminent 
and again expressed his view that the foreign office had not been 
sincere in its efforts with the dictators. Eden avoided confron-
tation but on his return to the foreign office he wrote Chamberlain 
a letter stating that despite their consultation he was more than 
ever convinced of the necessity for accepting Roosevelt's proposal. 
He then received Horace Wilson who reported that Chamberlain was 
disturbed at their differences, especially over de jure recog-
nition. Wilson said that Chamberlain was adamant that an Italian 
settlement was more important than the American plan. Eden 
immediately rang the British Embassy in Washington to say that 
if they would do everything at their end to encourage Roosevelt 
he would do everything he could in London to get acceptance. 10 
9. At one a.m. 
10 . Harvey,pp. 71-73· 
Bo. 
On the 18th Roosevelt's letter arrived. It stated that 
he was willing to deter his appeal but objected to de jure 
. t• 11 recogni ion. Eden decided that Roosevelt's plan must be 
backed fully and consequently de jure recognition must be 
dropped completely. He explained his views to Chamberlain. 
Chamberlain refused to accept them. He showed Eden a letter 
from his sister-in-law in Italy claiming that this was a 
12 
'psychological moment' which made Italy ready for a settlement. 
He therefore wished to write to Roosevelt giving full reasons for 
de jure recognition and entreating him to hold back at least 
until Anglo-Italian negotiations were under way. 
11. Roosevelt to Chamberlain, January 17, 1938, in U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 
1938 (1), PP• 120-22. 
'The recognition of the conquest of Ethiopia which at 
some appropriate time may have to be regarded as an 
accomplished fact would seem to me to be a matter 
which affects all nations which are committed to the 
principles of non-recognition and which should con-
sequently be dealt with as an integral part of measures 
for world appeasement in which all nations of the world 
have previously demonstrated their common interest and 
their willingness to bear individual responsibility.' 
12. Lady Chamberlain, the wife of Neville's late half-brother 
Austen, was in Rome. Ciano used her to advance his 
maneuvering with Britain; she was treated politely but 
regarded as a tool. On her wearing of the Fascist 
Party Badge, Ciano commented that he was too patriotic 
to appreciate such a gesture from an Englishwoman. 
Ciano, Journal, pp. 85-89, 101. 
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On the morning of the 19th Hankey and Vansittart made 
strong pleas to Eden. Grandi wrote for an interview with 
Eden and Chamberlain. Eden asked Grandi to see him alone. 
Grandi accepted. His position was as in late December -
Italy was anxious to start conversations but de jure recog-
nition could not be left out. In the afternoon the Committee 
of Imperial Defence discussed Roosevelt's proposal. Chamberlain 
quoted his sister-in-law and showed his draft telegram to 
Roosevelt re-explaining his hopes for de jure recognition. 
The telegram made no reference to the acceptance of Roosevelt's 
plan. Eden asked if he might study the draft overnight. 13 
On the morning of the 20th Horace Wilson put further 
pressure on Eden. Eden immediately saw Chamberlain and hinted 
resignation. - Chamberlain wavered, and at the meeting of the 
Committee in the afternoon Eden agreed to draft three telegrams -
two to Roosevelt, asking him not to deter his plan any longer 
and explaining the cabinet views on de jure recognition, but 
stating an intention to de er them, and one to the British 
Embassy in Washington asking for modifications in the wording 
of the Roosevelt plan. A meeting the followding day went even 
further towards meeting Eden's case. Four telegrams were 
produced, two to Roosevelt as above, and two to the British 
Embassy - one giving them discretion in the handling of the 
situation, (they were not to be enthusiastic but at the same 
13. Harvey, PP• 72-75• 
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not discouraging while working for points of change in the 
plan) and a second explaining in detail the nature of the 
Mediterranean 'deadlock'. Finally, the Committee agreed that 
the whole question of de jure recognition must be reconsidered 
in the light of Roosevelt's plan and that no commitment to Anglo-
Italian conversations should be given to Grandi. 
On the 23rd telegrams from Sumner Welles, the United States 
Under-Secretary of State, revealed that Roosevelt was relieved 
that de jure recognition was not to be granted in the immediate 
future and then only as part of a general settlement and that 
h t . t d. t b. th. ld 1. d. t 1 14 e was no in en ing o ring ou is wor appea 1mme ia e Y• 
The next day the full Cabinet heard of Roosevelt's plan for the 
first time in a meeting called to give Eden his final briefing 
before leaving for Geneva. Eden was instructed, with a view to 
ascertaining French feeling, to inform France that no progress 
had yet been made in Italian conversations but that the Cabinet 
had been considering the kind of settlement they might hope to 
obtain in return for de jure recognition. He was told to 
discourage any raising of the question of de jure recognition 
at the League. It was decided that as soon as Roosevelt's 
reactions to the latest batch of telegrams were known, the 
whole question of Italian conversations should be taken up 
again. It was considered 'desirable, if practicable, to 
14. Harvey, PP• 76-78. 
discontinue the use of the term de jure recognition.• Some 
phrase should be substituted which 'implied recognition of an 
international change' - for example •recognition for inter-
national purposes of the conquest of Abyssinia', and •recog-
nition of the Italian position in Ethiopia•. 15 Just before 
Eden left for Geneva, Roosevelt telegraphed briefly that he 
was 'deeply gratified' by the British telegrams. 16 
Back from Geneva on the 31st Eden reported to the Cabinet 
that if conversations included Spain, there would be little 
obstruction from the French. 'He himself had told most of the 
foreign ministers something of what was in the minds of our 
government, without committing himself to details. He thought 
it would be fair to s~ that if we could arrive at an arrange-
ment for general appeasement with Italy, more especially if it 
included Spain, we should encounter no difficulties at Geneva.• 
He indicated that there was 'general concern' at Geneva over 
Spain. 'What would be the effect of General Franco's recent 
failures on Signor Mussolini, who would be faced with a fresh 
decision and would have to choose between going deeper into 
the mire or cutting his losses?' He presented the cabinet 
with foreign office reports of further Italian reinforcements 
in the Balaeries and Spain. 17 At the Foreign Office, however, 
he presented his case more forcefully. There must be a general 
settlement, or nothing 8 no 'shady bargain', no 'purely 
15. P.R.O. Cab. 23/92 C.C. 1(38)2. 
16. Harvey, P• 79. 
17. P.R.O. Cab. 23/92 C.C. 2(38)2. 
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Anglo-Italian settlement of Anglo-Italian questions.• 18 
In the first week of February, Mussolini renewed his 
Mediterranean attacks for the first time since Nyon. Roosevelt 
requested the cabinet to 'hold back ••• horses' a little longer 
while they awaited a public communication of his plan - but he 
had no objections to Anglo-Italian conversations. Eden saw 
Grandi and Grandi agreed on the importance of Spain. Chamberlain 
requested Eden to summon Grandi to announce the start of conver-
sations because of Roosevelt's new position. Eden refused on 
the grounds that ~oosevelt's telegram was contradictory. 
Chamberlain then relayed a message through Horace Wilson request-
ing Eden to invite Grandi to a joint meeting. Eden again refused. 
He pointed out that the Committee of Imperial Defence had decided 
that conversations should be dropped completely and be reconsidered 
when Roosevelt's full reaction was known. 
On February 9th press campaigns crying up the prospects for 
an early and complete Anglo-Italian settlement were mounted. 
The Foreign Office News Department claimed that they could only 
have come from Chamberlain's quarters. Eden gave instructions 
to his newsmen to dampen down all reports. There were fresh 
rumours of cabinet intrigue and further reports of Lady Chamber-
18. Harvey, P• 81. 
lain's informal diplomacy. 19 Eden confronted Chamberlain with 
these three developments. Chamberlain denied any knowledge of 
the press leakage, was non-commital on his sister-in-law and 
t . l b t. t. 20 seep ica a ou in rigue. To the Cabinet Eden indicated 
that he proposed to continue discussions with Grandi on not 
only Spain but propaganda. 'If that had the effect of damping 
down the broadcasts from Bari this would enable conversations 
to be advanced step by step in other subjects.• He proposed 
that he be allowed to continue informal consultation with 
Grandi 'in preference to inaugurating formal conversations 
between Drummond and Ciano in Rome, with all the publicity 
involved.' Chamberlain agreed but suggested that 'at a certain 
point Ciano might come to London to finish off the conversations.• 
The cabinet enquired about Eden's lukewarm press comments. Eden 
was silent. Chamberlain assured the cabinet that 'it was not 
the intention of the Foreign Secretary to lay down conditions 
precedent to the conversations.' Eden emphasised that Spain 
must be in any settlement. Chamberlain replied that Grandi would 
not discuss Spain unless the possibility of recognition was in 
the background but he 'gathered Grandi was not troubled by this 
19. In particular a report of a conversation from Vansittart 
in which Swinton had allegedly said that Vansittart had 
been 'kicked upstairs', that foreign affairs would now be 
run by Chamberlain and a small committee, and Eden would 
have to fall in or go. Harvey, P• 86. 
20. Harvey, PP• 82-84. 
86. 
21 
aspect.• However, when Eden saw Grandi about Spain and 
propaganda on the 10th, Grandi retracted from the inclusion of 
Spain. Eden gave Grandi a new scheme for Italian withdrawals 
from Spain for study in Rome. 22 
The 11th saw the receipt of a telegram from the British 
Embassy in Washington indicating that Roosevelt thought Britain 
'lukewarm• over his proposals. Eden wrote a telegram expressing 
enthusiasm which Chamberlain promptly pruned. 23 Eden informed 
the cabinet that he 'proposed to press forward with the Spanish 
question as rapidly as possible' and that he would circulate to 
the Committee of Imperial Defence •a Memorandum as to desiderata 
for the proposed conversations, with a suggested timetable.• 
He 'promised to bear in mind a suggestion by the prime minister 
21. P.R.O. Cab. 23/92 c.c. 3(38)4. 
22. Harvey, P• 87. 
23. Harvey, p. 88. 
The historians for the United States Council of Foreign 
Affairs have argued that the report was 'hardly plausible' 
and that in enthusiasm for Anglo-American unison, the 
British Embassy may have overstated the American account. 
William L. Lange and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge 
to Isolation, 1937-1940, New York, 1952. P• 28. 
r 
that instead of transferring conversations to Rome ••• it was 
desirable to work for continuance ••• with Grandi in London and 
24 for Ciano to come to London to conclude them.' 
On the 15th news of the Austrian crisis reached the 
Foreign Office. 25 On the 16th Chamberlain told Eden that he 
had heard that Grandi wished for an immediate opening to conver-
sations, in view of Austrian developments. He asked Eden to 
arrange aj)int interview with Grandi to enquire about Austria. 
Eden agreed but reiterated that there must be only informal 
consultation. He adamantly maintained that a Spanish settlement, 
24. P.R.O. Cab. 23/92. C.C. 4(38) 3, 4. 
25. At a stormy meeting at Berchtesgaden on February 12th, 
Hitler had made demands on the Austrian Chancellor, 
Kurt von Schussnigg, including making the Austrian 
Nazi, Arthur Seyss-Inguart, Minister of the Interior 
and lifting the ban on Nazi atrocities. See Gordon 
Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss, New York, 1963, PP• 42-63. 
Eden had apparently told Ribbentrop in December 1937 that 
the Austrian question •was of much greater importance to 
Italy than to England', whose people 'recognised that a 
close connection between Germany and Austria would have to 
come about sometime', though they wished to avoid force. 
D.G.F.P. 1 (50) Ribbentrop to Neurath. 
Faced with the news of February 15th 'A.E. determined 
not to get into the false position of giving the 
Austrians advice and the situation gets worse. We 
cannot fight for Austria and we must be careful not 
to raise false hopes ••• after all it is more Musso•s 
funeral than ours.• Harvey, p.90. 
To the cabinet Eden said that 'he did not want to put 
himself in a position of suggesting a resistance which 
we could not, in fact, furnish.' 
P.R.O. Cab. 23/92 C.C. 5(38)2. 
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not merely Italian assurances, had to be the sine qua non for 
formal conversations. Later that day and on the following 
Eden tried to persuade Grandi to come to the Foreign Office 
for consultations without Chamberlain. 26 The Italian 
ambassador put him off, on the first occasion sending a message 
that he was expecting a favourable reply from Ciano on Italian 
withdrawals from Spain, on the second pleading a prior golfing 
27 
engagement. 
Chamberlain sent Sir Joseph Ball, head of the Conservative 
28 Research Department, to the Italian Embassy to persuade Grandi 
to accept Foreign Office invitations; Ball explained that 
Chamberlain would be present at an interview on the following 
morning, the 17th. Grandi agreed to attend. 29 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
Harvey, P• 91. 
Grandi, 
Ciano, 
'I hate golf but pretend to play it when necessary.' 
Diplomatic, p. 162. 
It was also rumoured that Ball was responsible for the news 
leakage of February 9th. T~e retrospect, then, since he was 
Chamberlain's informal emissary, presumably Chamberlain had 
been at the back of it. 
Sir Joseph Ball threatened to write his memoirs throughout 
the fifties and sixties, claiming they would be the most 
revealing documents of cabinet relations in the 1930's. 
Unfortunately, he burnt his papers before he died. 
!!2.!:,, P• 623, comments on Ball: 'I never at any time had 
the remotest suspicion that Sir Joseph Ball might be an 
intermediary between the Italian Embassy and 10 Downing 
Street.• 
Ciano, Diplomatic, pp. 165-66. According to Feiling, 
Chamberlain had the view that the Foreign Office was 
trying to prevent him seeing Grandi. Certainly Eden 
wanted to get in alone first, but he had agreed to a 
joint interview. 
The pivotal joint interview with Grandi is well documented. 
One has a choice of the Foreign Office record30 and the more 
histrionic account of Grandi, 31 but basically Eden and Chamber-
lain argued out their differences before the Italian ambassador. 
Both threatened resignation and they took their respective cases 
to the Cabinet. 
Chamberlain and Eden may speak for themselves. Chamberlain 
argued in effect that it was now or never on Italy. This was 
'one of those opportunities that came at rare intervals and did 
not recur.• 'He himself believed that Count Grandi had been 
telling the truth. He knew that the Italians were often un-
reliable and unstable, but he had watched the ambassador care-
fully and at very close quarters and he had felt satisfied as 
to his veracity.• 'If we rejected the present approach it would 
be taken as a final rebuff and as a confirmation of the sus-
picions that the Italians had long harboured that we were post-
poning them to impose our own conditions.• 'Not to embrace the 
opportunity would be not only unwise but criminal.' 
30. P.R.O. Cab. 23/92 Cab. 6(38) Appendix. 
~' P• 616-17 Appendix C. 
31. Ciano, Diplomatic, PP• 182-83. 
'Chamberlain and Eden were not as a Prime Minister and 
a Foreign Secretary discussing with the Ambassador of 
a Foreign Power a delicate situation ••• they were two 
enemies confronting each other, like cocks in true 
fighting posture.• 
One has, of course, to make allowances for a fascist 
diplomat who had to pep up his copy for home to safe-
guard his own political capital. See Craig, PP• 220-247. 
Felix Gilbert, 'Ciano and his Ambassadors• in The Diplomats 
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Eden •could not take the view of a change i n Mussolini's 
attitude without further proof.' 'If Signor Mussolini was so 
desperately anxious to change camps it would be easy for him 
to give proof of good faith and good will. He had given none.' 
With the exception of MacDonald,32 Elliot , 33 Zetland34 and 
to some extent Morrison3i the cabinet was with Chamberlain. 
Simon laid emphasis on the fact that the cabinet •was dealing 
not with a difference of principle but with a question of 
timing and method.' Chamberlain snubbed his suggestion that a 
resignation should only take place on a question of principle. 
Eden stated that he •could not recommend to parliament a policy 
with which he was not in agreement.• 36 The meeting adjourned. 
Between meetings Chamberlain asked Eden if Italian accept-
ance of the new formula for withdrawal from Spain would make any 
1919-19,29 
536. 
VolumeII, The Thirties, New York 1963, PP• 512-
32. Secretary of State for Dominions. 
33. Secretary of State for Scotland. 
34. Secretary of State for India. 
35. Financial Secretary to the Treasury. 
36. P. R.O. Cab. 23/92. Cab. 6(38). 
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difference. Grandi had accepted the formula, relaying the 
information through one of Chamberlain's informal agents. 37 
Eden admitted 'quite straight-forwardly and simply that it 
would not.• 38 
On Sunday 19th Eden announced his resignation to the 
Cabinet. He told them that the difference was •more a matter 
of emphasis and handling than principle.• He •could not 
disguise that there was a difference of outlook between him-
self and some of his colleagues, including the prime minister.• 
He cited the Roosevelt initiative and the conviction that 
'opportunities had been missed' with the dictators. 'The 
Cabinet had before them a number of difficult decisions •••• 
it might be that he and they would not see eye to eye.• 
Chamberlain told the Cabinet of Grandi's new position. 
'The Foreign Secretary would say that that would not remove his 
objections to conversations.• He charged Eden with being 
'prepared to postpone them even at the risk of no further 
opportunity of opening.,39 
37. Presumably Ball. Ball had already conveyed Chamberlain's 
appreciation for cooperation in the interview of the 17th, 
to Grandi. 
38. Hansard, 332, 22.!• 258. 
39. P.R.O. Cab. 23/92 Cab. 7(38). 
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A sub-committee was set up to find a compromise. It was 
suggested that Eden should agree to the formal opening of 
conversations provided Italy accepted the withdrawal formula 
but that there would be no de jure recognition until after a 
Spanish settlement. Eden refused to accept the plan and 
resigned. 
Chamberlain •suggested that all should stand together and 
face the situation.• Simon remarked that 'all had had a trying 
day'. He wished Chamberlain •to accept an expression of loyalty 
in the certainty that he would make the case [in the Commons] 
with his usual skill as well as it could be made.• 'This 
proposal met with general assent.• 40 Eden went to the Foreign 
Office to prepare his resignation speech. 
4o. P.R.O. Cab. 23/92 Cab. 8(38). 
92. 
CONCLUSION 
When Chamberlain accused Eden of having missed chance 
after chance he was hardly being fair. The foregoing paper 
clearly illustrates that 'whatever his personal feelings' 
Eden cannot be charged with having been deliberately obstruct-
ionist to the course of Anglo-Italian negotiations throughout 
1937 any more than he can be identified with the zealous 
pursuit of conversations by an alarmist cabinet majority. 
In his role of Foreign Secretary he did what was required of 
him by majority cabinet decision, but no more. An Anglo-
Italian detente was not in Eden's hands. Essentially, anything 
beyond informal consultation was impossible in 1937 because of 
Mussolini's sine qua non of a British lead in de jure recog-
nition of Abyssinia at the League of Nations. Although this 
might do no more than •express the realities of the situation• 
the cabinet was not prepared to act without at least French 
cooperation. When in September Eden directly confronted the 
cabinet with the question: 'Assuming Signor Mussolini continued 
his present policy in the Mediterranean was it still suggested 
that our policy should be to turn Abyssinia out of the League?', 
Inskip's reply summed up the cabinet's consistent position. 
'The answer must be in the affirmative, but ••• the implementation 
of that policy had become impossible.• 
The accumulation and retraction of British desiderata 
for conversations were relevant only in so far as they expressed 
cabinet hopes for getting the necessary Italian assurances to 
93. 
make de jure recognition possible through a 'great scheme of 
reconciliation•. From December, the withdrawal of Italy from 
the League made de jure recognition through its agency not 
only impossible from the point of view of British justification 
for the action but also impossible in fact. The attendant 
contemplation of British recognition independent of the League 
saw Chamberlain's swinging attitude to Italy narrowed down 
to whole-hearted acceptance of the need to pursue de jure recog-
nition as part of a 'hard bargain' with Italy, rationalised as 
a 'great scheme of reconciliation.• The onset of a policy that 
Chamberlain was to pursue consistently beyond Eden's resignation 
coincided with a softer line on the issue by the Foreign Secretary 
as part of a pattern of personal reconciliation after relative 
estrangement, reconciliation the more necessary to keep Chamber-
lain's support against an increasingly hostile cabinet majority. 
Chamberlain's complete opposition to Eden's championship 
of the Roosevelt initiative saw a hardening of attitudes on both 
sides. Because of cabinet acceptance of the need to grant 
de jure recognition in the possible independent setting and 
apparent French concurrence Anglo-Italian conversations became 
distinctly possible for the first time in February 1938. In this 
context Eden's desiderata became relevant. Proportionately to 
the hardening of Chamberlain's stand the nature of Eden's 
assurances of Italian 'good faith and goodwill' became more 
demanding. In effect Eden demanded a 'change of heart and 
attitude' from Italy. Eden's long standing antipathy to Italy 
had not been relevant to the execution of policy as long as the 
94. 
cabinet prevaricated on de jure recognition. In a situation of 
imminent conversations it became central. What was specifically 
a matter of 'method and timing', more widely in the context of 
cabinet deliberation on the nature of the February conversations 
was an expression of Eden's personal prejudice against Italy. 
Throughout 1937 Italian and British estrangement, essentially 
because Britain would not meet Mussolini's demands, had served 
Eden's waiting game. When Chamberlain told the cabinet in 
February that the postponement of conversations would confirm 
•suspicions ••• that we were postponing them to impose our own 
conditions• he was, wittingly or unwittingly, expressing Eden's 
attitude. 
In 1937 a basic policy divergence on Italy had not emerged, 
despite attitudinal variations, because there was no middle way 
between acquiescence to Italian demands, pending the League 
initiative, and offensive, impossible in view of cautious defence 
expenditure centred on Germany. Eden's defiant 'open diplomacy• 
and occasional dreams of offensive, from which he had been easily 
warned off, were not significant enough to translate personal 
prejudice into an alternative policy. Once conversations which 
would lead to a settlement were close the waiting game was no 
longer irrelevant, and Eden resigned. If de jure recognition and 
the empty Roosevelt plan had not been posed as alternatives in 
January, Eden may have made more concessions but essentially the 
divergence would have remained intact. 
Eden made no attempt to translate the occasion for the rift 
into a matter of general principle in foreign policy imperatives. 
95. 
He could not have effectively done so because, despite his 
warnings to the cabinet in February, on his collective record 
in office with Chamberlain there was no essential difference in 
policy towards the perceived greater totalitarian menace, 
Germany. The Halifax visit was a special case. Eden actively 
pursued the colonial German settlement. 
Beyond the Italian context of the rift lies the matter of 
cabinet intrigue and slighting of foreign office protocol. 
That personal as well as policy factors were involved is beyond 
dispute. But in the development of the rift in its Italian 
context they are most consistently seen as arising from and 
exacerbating precise divergences in the execution of policy -
if the focus is limited to Eden and Chamberlain. Matters of 
prejudice and envy are obvious in the intrigues of Hoare, 
Simon and Swinton. They are contributing factors to Eden and 
Chamberlain's relations; but this centres on the struggle for 
control in the Foreign Office. In retrospect many of their 
altercations seem merely silly, abrasive Chamberlain and 
temperamental Eden simmering with unspoken resentments, and, 
if put in their cabinet context, pall into relative insignif-
icance beside Eden's wider estrangement from the cabinet 
majority; in this setting Eden's claim: that in January 1937 
he and the prime minister •were seriously at odds for the first 
time' becomes no more than gentlemanly reticence. 
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